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How is the resilience of communities to climate change in the UK currently understood and 
practised? The concept of community resilience to climate change in the UK has a diverse range 
of meanings and associated activities. This review of evidence and practice explores this varied 
and contested field to build the evidence base and help support the development of community 
resilience to climate change.
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Ho is the resilience of communities to climate change in the UK currently 
understood and practised? The concept of community resilience to climate 
change in the UK has a diverse range of meanings and associated activities. 
This revie of evidence and practice explores this varied and contested 
field to build the evidence base and help support the development of 
community resilience to climate change. 
The report shos: 
• the range of definitions of resilience to climate change across policy, academia and practice; 
• the variety of actions being carried out across the UK that can be classed as improving resilience of 
communities to climate change; 
• the barriers and facilitators to improving resilience to climate change for communities; 
• the value of a frameork to understand resilience of communities to climate change that emphasises 
existing capacities of communities, engagement and empoerment of citizens, and multi-level 
governance; and 
• examples of innovative actions to improve resilience of communities to climate change ith a focus 
on four case studies.  
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Executive summary 
The meanings, applications and implications of the concept of ‘resilience’ 
are contested, varied and not ell understood in the context of UK climate 
change action. To address this and thereby support the development of 
community resilience to climate change, the Joseph Rontree Foundation 
(JRF) commissioned a revie of the research exploring the relationship 
beteen community action on climate change in the UK and the broader 
evidence-base around resilience. 
Investigating community resilience to climate change 
The project used a systematic evidence-revie strategy, screening and classifying studies to identify 108 
high-quality documents for detailed analysis, combined ith input from a range of experts together ith 
a orkshop for key stakeholders. The revie focuses on evidence and practice around climate change 
resilience at the community level, but also has a focus on three key areas of action: flood risk 
management, food groing and community energy. Four short case studies of community actions 
addressing climate change consequences ere undertaken, alongside consultation ith the JRF Climate 
Change and Communities Programme dvisory Netork (March 2015), to understand emerging practice 
in more depth (through document revie and a small number of in-depth intervies). The revie 
examines the folloing key issues: 
 
• the concept of community resilience to climate change: hat the term means and ho it is used in 
research, policy and practice; 
• hat key factors create community resilience to climate change; 
• the nature of emerging practice;  
• factors that may support or hinder the development of community resilience to climate change; 
• the roles of different stakeholders in supporting this; and  
• the relationship beteen vulnerability and resilience. 
 
hat does the concept of ‘community resilience to 
climate change’ mean? 
No commonly agreed definition of ‘community resilience’ in the context of climate change action in the 
UK as evident from the revie, and its contested nature is also clear. Hoever, there are a number of 
definitions of resilience that have similar core concepts. Draing on the evidence, the concept can be 
broadly summarised as: the ability of communities to reduce exposure to, prepare for, cope ith, recover 
better from, adapt and transform as needed to, the direct and indirect effects of climate change, here 
these effects can be both shocks and stresses.  
 
This definition introduces a number of important terms, described in Box 1. 
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Box 1: Unpicking the concept of community resilience in the context of climate change  
 
• The direct effects of climate change can be seen as direct impacts, such as increased flooding and 
heataves, that are expected to arise due to global arming. 
• The indirect effects include less obvious issues that may be a result of these impacts, such as 
increased food prices due to food shortages in certain areas here extreme temperatures and 
extreme eather cause crop failure. 
• Shocks can be seen as short-term events ith immediate impacts such as flash floods, hile stresses 
tend to occur over a longer time frame as enduring problems, for example potential longer-term 
impacts on housing markets from changes in local flood risk and insurance pricing. 
• There is also a distinction beteen ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ resilience: proactive emphasises 
adaptation and transformation; reactive focuses on resistance and ‘bounce-back’. 
 
cademic definitions suggest a key component to successfully building resilience is to understand and 
develop the capacities ithin a community. This revie builds on Cutter et al.’s (2010) model for 
categorising community resilience capacities/resources. Its five categories of resilience capacities are: 
social, institutional, infrastructure, economic and community capital.  
 
The revie examines examples of action through this lens of ‘community resilience’ to assess ho far 
current action in the UK is increasing community capacities, and may ultimately be building resilience to 
the direct and indirect effects of climate change in the long term. It suggests that to be effective, 
emphasis needs to be on proactive approaches to building long-term resilience to climate change 
consequences. 
 
Ho is the term used in practice? 
hile popular in some academic fields (e.g. ithin disaster management and development) and ithin 
policy, the concept of ‘resilience’ has not been a core driver of community action. Instead, community 
actions more often employ the terms ‘sustainability’ or ‘self-sufficiency’. If ‘resilience’ is considered, 
climate change may not be the main focus. There are exceptions, such as the Transition movement and 
some national funders of community action. 
 
Ho is community resilience to climate change framed 
at the policy level? 
Currently, the policy focus in relation to community resilience to climate is generally on direct shocks due 
to extreme eather events, rather than longer-term stresses, leading to an emphasis on emergency 
planning and the role of the community linked to other institutions in supporting responses. This 
emphasises a predominantly reactive approach.  
 
Other areas of policy are directed toards tackling indirect shocks and stresses relating to climate 
change, but they are framed as climate change mitigation rather than as supporting community resilience 
(for example, the Lo Carbon Communities programme and the Community Energy strategy). In 
addition, there is ork on adaptation primarily driven through the National daptation Programme led by 
the Department for Environment, Food & Rural ffairs (Defra). 
 
Capturing emerging practice that supports community 
resilience to climate change in the UK 
It is difficult to capture and provide a comprehensive account of all emerging practice, as community 
action to address climate change in the UK is diverse, yet patchy, and fragmented. Community groups 
and local projects vary greatly in size, formality and stage of development. ctivities on different aspects 
of the agenda ill overlap and the number of initiatives is not static; indeed, it is constantly in flux. This 
echoes the patchork of community resilience definitions.  
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Limited evidence as found on community action to address ater scarcity and heataves; far more 
evidence exists around flood risk management, energy (efficiency and reneable energy generation), and 
food groing. This may reflect that these are issues here UK citizens have the most direct experience 
and responses are more formally organised. In addition, community food groing and energy initiatives 
are often motivated by concerns other than climate change. 
 
Factors that support the development of community 
resilience to climate change 
The paucity of evaluations and different framings of issues mean that understanding the key drivers of 
community resilience to climate change is not straightforard. Hoever, evidence points to the 
importance of: 
 
• framing agendas broadly: community action that can stimulate resilience to climate change is 
motivated by a range of factors, including concerns about climate change, but there are also other 
motives. To engage communities, the framing of initiatives should go beyond climate change to 
incorporate actions that address a community’s ider priorities, and that cultivate skills, 
understanding and onership of responses to climate change, as ell as other issues; 
• existing capacities ithin a community: it is important to understand the starting point and the 
capacities that already exist in a community, to inform action on climate change resilience. 
Community capital (links beteen citizens, social netorks) and institutional capacity (formal and 
informal organisations, together ith links beteen them) seem to be particularly crucial; and 
• support from the community (e.g. residents’ associations) and voluntary organisations (e.g. the 
National Flood Forum) to act as intermediaries: to provide guidance and stepping stones for forming 
a ne partnership aimed at developing community climate change resilience, and supporting skills 
and knoledge exchange. 
 
Roles of different stakeholders in facilitating 
community resilience to climate change 
The value of pre-existing capacities and knoledge cannot be underestimated, especially in the current 
political climate here responsibility is being devolved from the national government don to a local level 
(community and local authority). This is alongside cuts in spending and staff in local authorities, making 
reliance on community members to initiate and lead actions much greater. This has implications for the 
extent to hich actions focus on those ho are most climate disadvantaged. 
 
• Civil society organisations: under the UK Government’s localism agenda, civil society organisations,1 
such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community organisations, have an increasingly 
important and ide-ranging role in response to climate change consequences, but financial and 
human resources are limited. They have a key role as intermediaries beteen people, government 
and organisations, facilitating public engagement and dialogue, and strengthening partnership 
orking.  
• Local government: the revie suggests that the ability of local authorities to lead actions to address 
climate change consequences has been limited by the lack of a statutory requirement to address 
climate change, capacity and funding.  
• National government: there is a role for government to develop a strategic national frameork for 
action on resilience to climate change that addresses climate vulnerability, builds on community 
capacities, outlines a joined-up approach across government departments and agencies, and 
increases coherence in policy. Specifically, policy around emergency responses should be considered 
in relation to adaptation to climate change, so that community action is appropriate and co-
ordinated.  
• Local citizens: there is an essential role for individual citizens to drive community resilience. 
Frequently, it is the commitment and capacity of citizens that enables the development and 
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maintenance of community resilience activities. Hoever, the revie shos that for this to be 
successful, it needs to be linked to formal governance structures and netorks. This linking can 
provide a useful challenge to formal institutions, shoing ho radical solutions ork in practice, as 
ell as providing key connections to the lived experiences of community resilience. 
 
Effective governance of community action in relation to building resilience to climate change is flexible 
and in touch ith local realities, and part of strategic approaches to climate change at the national level. 
Intermediary organisations and partnership/multi-agency orking that develops links and involves strong, 
committed, confident and proactive stakeholders ith a shared agenda can offer and develop community 
resilience capacities.  joined-up approach beteen grassroots and top-don interventions ould help 
to ensure long-term community resilience, and that climate vulnerable areas are addressed. 
 
The relationship beteen vulnerability and resilience 
Resilience is about draing on, as ell as building, capacities, and should not reproduce social 
vulnerabilities. Resilience as 'bounce-back' in the context of shocks is not enough for longer-term 
management of climate change, particularly if high levels of vulnerabilities exist in a locality. Vulnerability 
is a function of the exposure and sensitivity of a system, and:  
 
Vulnerability is the pre-event, inherent characteristics or qualities of social systems that 
create the potential for harm… Resilience is the ability of a social system to respond and 
recover from disasters and includes those inherent conditions that allo the system to 
absorb impacts and cope ith an event, as ell as post-event, adaptive processes that 
facilitate the ability of the social system to re-organize, change, and learn in response to a 
threat.  
Cutter et al., 2008 
 
The revie recognises that social vulnerability of communities to the effects of climate change is not just 
the opposite of resilience. It is possible for a person or community to be vulnerable to shocks and 
stresses in some ays, yet resilient in others through having capacities to adapt or overcome that 
vulnerability.  
 
 lack of national strategy to build community resilience to climate change makes it less likely that areas 
of climate vulnerability are prioritised and targeted. Those areas ith high social vulnerability are also 
likely to have loer levels of pre-existing capacities that could support climate change resilience. 
Therefore the most vulnerable areas, both socially and in terms of climate change, may be the least likely 
to develop community-led resilience actions, hich could lead to future problems if they are hit by the 
consequences of climate change. This is a key area for future research and action. 
 
Key recommendations 
Local authorities 
• Local authorities could use areas of statutory ork, e.g. on flood risk and energy, to gro community 
resilience to a ider set of climate change issues. Furthermore, other policy agendas such as spatial 
planning and health could be an important route for developing clearer local climate resilience 
strategies and actions, e.g. to enable green infrastructure as part of efforts to support vulnerable 
communities, or developing heatave plans for care homes.  
• They could recognise and develop a role linking formal and informal processes of governance (e.g. 
beteen local councils and voluntary and community groups) and develop approaches to 
partnership-orking that allo for grassroots and intermediaries’ involvement, e.g. orking ith the 
Transition movement, or the National Flood Forum. 
• Initial funding is a key factor for the success of community climate change resilience initiatives. In a 
context of shrinking local authority budgets, developing multi-stakeholder partnerships can facilitate 
access to alternative sources of funding.  
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• Community capacity, skills and netorks are crucial components of resilience to climate change, and 
to ider shocks and stresses. Local authorities can help build this by recognising the value of 
community-led actions across departments, involving representatives in multi-agency meetings, and 
promoting links beteen community organisations and institutions ith responsibilities for climate 
action.  
• Local authorities could identify people and places that face high social vulnerability to the 
consequences of climate change, and facilitate partnerships to carry out actions to support the most 
vulnerable communities in developing resilience. 
National government 
• Overall, ‘Central Government needs to provide stronger leadership on climate change adaptation to 
increase its political visibility and urgency amongst local government’ (Porter et al., 2015). 
• Central government could develop a cross-government definition and approach to community 
resilience in the context of climate change that goes beyond emergency planning, includes a 
proactive focus, and clarifies the roles of different stakeholders.  
• It should further develop orking across Defra and the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) on flooding, and Defra and the Department for Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) on energy and climate change, and link in Department for International Development (DFID) 
thinking for the next Climate Change Risk ssessment and National daptation Programme.  
• It could also recognise that to achieve the goals of building community resilience to climate change 
requires a clear vision of the role of local authorities as enablers of community action on climate 
change, alongside the voluntary sector and members of local communities.  
• It should focus programmes of grants on areas of social vulnerability and climate hazard exposure. 
For example, it could consider establishing a resilience funding stream ith a clear evaluation 
programme to ensure progress is assessed.  
• Central government needs to join-up policy on community resilience to climate change by looking at 
opportunities for resilience-building in the context of:  
• measures focusing on mitigation or indirect shocks and stresses relating to climate change, for 
example, the Community Energy strategy and energy efficiency measures, or other social 
interventions; and 
• emergency planning responses, here a longer-term, more proactive approach to prepare and adapt 
to climate change is also needed.  
• For the idest range of civil society organisations to participate, the government needs to support 
the sector to create a national infrastructure that: 
• provides information on funding opportunities and best practice to local service providers, and 
facilitates dialogue beteen all parties about needs, priorities, service design and delivery; 
• assists in the formation of bidding consortia, to ensure that civil society organisations of all sizes 
benefit from opportunities to tender for services; and 
• helps service providers to demonstrate impact by providing information on measurement tools and 
frameorks. 
 
Communities 
• Communities can evaluate their capacities (strengths and eaknesses) and start from those points to 
develop ne capacities in relation to climate change resilience. They can learn from existing 
initiatives about ho to make the most of available resources, potential pitfalls to look out for, and 
solutions. 
• They should start activities that develop community participation and netorks, but have a longer-
term vision, as ell as building on local interests to develop interest and engagement. This may not 
alays require a specific focus on climate change. ctions that start by dealing ith a community’s 
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daily concerns and aim to increase community ell-being can be more appealing than a specific 
climate change focus. 
• Making links ith key local institutions, e.g. local government, is key to developing common goals and 
influencing local agendas, sharing learning, and garnering input and support. Communities need to 
understand the focus of the local council and frame activities to make connections ith their 
agendas. 
• Building in ays to monitor and evaluate community action from the start ill help to generate 
evidence of impact and benefits, and to share learning and best practice. 
• It is important for communities to recognise that: 
• actions to build resilience are likely to take longer than anticipated; and 
• it is not necessary to be an expert on climate change to increase a community’s climate change 
resilience; other initiatives, such as reclaiming green space for community uses and promoting local 
food production, are excellent ays of building community capacities and developing resilience.  
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1 Introduction 
The Joseph Rontree Foundation (JRF) commissioned Collingood Environmental Planning (CEP), in 
collaboration ith Professor Gordon alker and Dr Neil Simcock (Lancaster University), Dr lexia Coke 
(independent researcher) and Professor ndy Stirling (University of Sussex), to undertake an evidence 
revie on community resilience to climate change as part of the Climate Change and Communities 
programme. The research as undertaken beteen July 2014 and May 2015.  
 
Understanding hat orks at the community level to build resilience to climate change, in terms of 
mitigation of shocks and adaptation to stresses, remains a complex challenge for UK policy and practice. 
This complexity is characterised by a number of key issues: defining ‘resilience’, having a clear idea of 
resilience ‘to hat’, and understanding hat is being sustained or transformed. Implicit and explicit 
framings of resilience shape both policy and practice; therefore this report builds on the existing evidence 
to consider the different definitions of the concept of resilience, and to clarify ho those affect policy 
and practice.  
 
In the context of climate change, people’s adaptive capacity in terms of their ability to prepare for, 
respond to and recover from climate impacts, is critical in understanding both social vulnerability and 
resilience. This report focuses on the resilience of individuals and communities to both shocks and 
longer-term stresses of climate change, to explore ho resilience can be conceptualised and put into 
practice. This is to support local organisations and communities in responding to climate change beyond a 
crisis context, ith a more transformative approach to help prepare different groups for a more 
sustainable future.  
 
ims and objectives of the project 
1. To explore the concept of resilience in the context of climate change, draing on literature from 
other fields and countries here relevant, and considering both local area resilience and, 
specifically, community resilience, and ho the to might relate.  
2. To identify key components of resilience and hat factors may support or undermine resilience 
in different contexts.  
3. To identify existing and emergent practice in relation to responding to the challenges posed by 
climate change (including both mitigation and adaptation examples), including community-led 
approaches and local actions developed in partnership across different organisations orking 
ith communities.  
4. To consider ho policy and practice can support the development of greater local resilience in 
the face of climate change. 
 
Research questions 
The original project specification provided the folloing research questions for the evidence revie: 
 
1. hat are the key components of the resilience of communities to climate change shocks and 
stresses? hat can e learn from the concepts and applications of the resilience of communities 
in other fields that could support the development of the resilience of communities in the face 
of climate change?  
2. hat factors support/undermine the development of community resilience in the face of 
climate change? 
3. hat are the roles of different stakeholders in developing resilience, considering, in particular, 
communities and local authorities?  
4. hat is the relationship beteen community resilience and: 
a. ider institutional and societal resilience? 
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b. the resilience of physical infrastructure in different localities? 
c. social and spatial vulnerability to climate change? 
5. hat practice is emerging that may be supporting resilience at a local level to: 
a. address the direct consequences of climate change (e.g. flooding, heataves and 
drought)?  
b. support the transition to a lo-carbon economy and society (e.g. through reductions in 
local energy demand, shifts in supply, increases in energy efficiency and community 
energy schemes)? 
6. hat is the relationship beteen vulnerability and resilience in the context of climate change?  
7. hat does existing evidence and emerging practice tell us about the current picture of resilience 
to climate change at the local level in the UK, and ho this could be enhanced in different 
contexts? 
This is a challenging set of questions. s the revie proceeded, it as clear that the amount of evidence 
available for each question as variable, and this is reflected in the reporting of the findings. 
 
Report outline 
The report is structured as follos: 
 
• Chapter 1: Introduction. 
• Chapter 2: Context – policy, community and climate change. This section provides an overvie of 
relevant policy and sets out the consequences of climate change at a community level, and the 
effects on and actions of communities to build resilience. 
• Chapter 3: Methodological approach. This section briefly outlines the methodological approach, 
including the processes employed to develop the search and analysis strategy of documents for 
inclusion in the evidence revie, to identify four case studies of practical and innovative approaches 
to community resilience to climate change, and to synthesise and analyse qualitative data.  
• Chapter 4: The case studies in brief. This section gives an overvie of the case studies that ere 
developed as part of the project, in order to provide context for later discussions. 
• Chapter 5: Considering resilience perspectives. n overvie of academic, policy and practitioner 
approaches to resilience in the context of communities, disasters and climate change is provided in 
this section. It concludes ith a frameork that is used to examine the evidence on community 
actions on climate change.  
• Chapter 6: The ider vie: emerging practice that supports community resilience to climate 
change. This section explores the extent of community action in the UK that is attempting to build 
community resilience to climate change or is linked to climate change, ho those involved are 
interpreting the concepts of community resilience, and hat is being done in practice.  
• Chapter 7: Factors that support or undermine the development of community resilience. This 
section looks at ho different social, economic and institutional conditions affect the development of 
locality and community resilience in the face of climate change. 
• Chapter 8: Governance and the roles of different stakeholders in developing community 
resilience. This section looks at governance partnerships and modes, and different stakeholders’ 
roles, capacities and strengths, relationships and interactions in the development of community 
resilience. 
• Chapter 9: The relationship beteen vulnerability and resilience. This section explores the 
relationship beteen vulnerability and resilience of communities, in literature and practice. 
• Chapter 10: Conclusions and key messages. This section dras out general lessons useful for 
developing future community resilience initiatives and refining current activities, and for addressing 
the particular needs of disadvantaged groups. It sets out key messages for different stakeholders, 
including national and local government, and communities. 
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2 Context: policy, community and 
climate change 
Climate change is one of the greatest risks facing society. Increases in the intensity and frequency of 
extreme eather events (global rainfall patterns, temperature and ind) ill be experienced in a number 
of ays: ‘such profound changes to the climate ill have multiple impacts on human society’ (Preston et 
al., 2014). The main consequences of climate change that communities in the UK are likely to experience 
include: increased flooding, heataves, drought, coastal erosion, sea-level rises and storm surges 
(Preston et al., 2014; Defra, 2012a). These are commonly referred to as the ‘direct’ consequences of 
climate change.  
 
’Indirect’ consequences of climate change that UK society is likely to experience are: risks to food and 
energy security; fuel poverty; rising costs of living (including the effects of increasing flood insurance 
premiums, energy bills and food prices); demands for ne infrastructure and reneable energy schemes; 
loss of property, possessions and livelihoods, etc. (Preston et al., 2014; PC, 2013). Evidence suggests 
that indirect social impacts ‘resulting from climate change elsehere in the orld may be as significant, if 
not more so than direct impacts at home’ (Foresight, 2011).  
 
This evidence revie takes the vie that community resilience to climate change is not only concerned 
ith the direct and indirect consequences of extreme eather, but also the ider social consequences of 
climate change, relating to the physical and mental health, and ider ell-being, of UK society. s 
SNIFFER (Chalmers et al., 2009) state:  
 
It ill also affect people’s access to, and the quality of, basic goods and services such as 
ater, shelter and food, as ell as other key priorities for human ellbeing such as 
education, employment and crime, therefore orsening social deprivation.  
 
s a result, UK society ill experience ‘shocks’ from the direct consequences of extreme eather (e.g. 
immediate damage to homes from floods) and ‘stresses’ from indirect, cumulative and longer-term 
effects (e.g. changes to the costs of living if food prices rise due to climate change, or if policy responses 
to reduce carbon result in higher household energy bills).  
 
Further indirect effects that, although more removed, may prove even larger in their consequences, 
include the effects of ar or pandemic engendered by international tensions or disruption consequent to 
climate change (Matthe et al., 2010; Dodds et al., 2009; Barnett and dger, 2007; McMichael, 2003). 
 
Some places, communities and social groups are likely to experience the effects of these threats 
disproportionately and unequally (Preston et al., 2014). Climate justice research has found that the 
community groups that are most vulnerable to the consequences of climate change are also those ho 
produce least in terms of emissions. Typically, these include: elderly people; deprived communities ith 
lo incomes, poor housing quality and limited mobility; people living in rented accommodation; people 
living in places at risk; and communities that lack aareness of the risks of climate change, or the capacity 
to adapt (Chalmers et al., 2009, Lindley et al., 2011). 
 
lthough there is a broad consensus around the consequences of climate change, the policy response in 
the UK is less clear-cut. The UK as one of the first countries to have a Climate Change ct (2008) and a 
National daptation Programme focused on addressing the consequences of climate change, suggesting 
a strong direction from central government. Hoever, in 2010, the UK Government launched the 
localism or ‘Big Society’ agenda:  
 
[…] it is time for a fundamental shift of poer from estminster to people. e ill promote 
decentralisation and democratic engagement, and e ill end the era of top-don 
government by giving ne poers to local councils, communities, neighbourhoods and 
individuals.  
Cabinet Office, 2010 
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This agenda has had to important impacts in relation to climate change: 
• Local authority requirements to report against national indicators ended: beteen 2008 and 2010 
there ere national performance indicators on carbon emissions reductions and climate change 
adaptation for local authorities. Instead, much of hat is in place no is voluntary.  
• Responsibility for action (including on climate change) has been shifted onto communities and 
voluntary organisations (collectively knon as ‘civil society’):  
The government is supporting people ho care about their communities and ant to get 
involved in improving them. It believes that people understand the needs of their area best, 
hich is hy it is transferring poer so people can make more decisions locally and solve 
their on problems to create strong, attractive and thriving neighbourhoods. 
UK Government, 2015  
 
From the outset, the concept of the Big Society has been critiqued as a thinly-veiled attempt to reduce 
the role of the state and devolve responsibilities for action to the community level. ith respect to 
climate change and its challenges, calls for community resilience at the local level and for people to take 
responsibility for flood risk, for example, have been challenged as an ‘appropriation of the climate 
challenge by neoliberalism’ (Henfrey and Kenrick, 2015). nd hile use of the term ‘resilience’ has 
increased over the past decade ithin the UK Government and more idely, it is contested, ith some 
suggesting that a resilience framing shifts the approach aay from addressing societal vulnerability to 
climate change (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2010). See Chapters 5 and 9 for further discussion.  
 
This shift toards localism is taking place in the context of major cuts to public sector budgets. The cuts 
implemented to date have led to ‘a 27 per cent reduction in the spending poer of local authorities in 
England beteen 2010/11 and 2014/15. Local authorities ith greater concentrations of disadvantaged 
population groups have suffered faster and deeper cuts, particularly those in urban areas’ (Hastings et al., 
2015). s the findings of Porter et al. (2014) of the University of Leeds sho, these cuts have affected 
the progress in adaptation by local authorities (Ls) in the UK:  
 
fter five years of budget cuts by the current Coalition Government, Ls have fe 
resources and little appetite for undertaking adaptation actions that are not directly relevant 
to their core statutory futures. In this context Ls are focused on immediate concerns, and 
adaptation to future climate change is no longer a priority. 
 
s Brisley et al. (2012) suggest, action on climate change adaptation at this level is not solely the 
responsibility of local authorities: ‘it is important that housing and health organisations, as ell as the 
emergency services and voluntary and community sector organisations, contribute to just adaptation’.  
 
The budget cuts and devolution of responsibility for public service delivery have significant implications 
for the voluntary and community sector (VCS) and civil society, and their role in climate change action. 
Chief Executive of the National Council of Voluntary Organisations’ (NCVO), Sir Stuart Etherington 
(2011), has expressed concerns:  
 
Nearly three quarters of the funding that our sector receives from the state is in the form 
of contracts to deliver services… it is the state that is dependent on us, for a hole range of 
services and support that are essential for the ellbeing of people and communities… hich 
is hy the scale and speed of the cuts is of such concern. 
 
This all points to a number of key contextual issues for this report’s investigation of the evidence and 
practice of community resilience to climate change consequences, and transitions toards a lo-carbon 
society: 
• the breadth and nature of consequences of climate change ill hit different localities and 
communities unequally; 
• the existing local context and levels of social vulnerability are likely to affect ho far communities can 
respond to these challenges; and 
• the policy context is one of increasing expectations for local action and self-reliance, but at the same 
time institutional capacity is diminishing, hile communities ill have differing levels of capacity to 
take up and respond to the challenge.   
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3 Methodological approach 
This section briefly outlines the methodological approach taken for the evidence revie, including the 
processes employed to: develop the search and analysis strategy of peer-revieed and grey literature for 
inclusion in the evidence revie; identify four case studies of practical and innovative approaches to 
community resilience to climate change; and to synthesise and analyse primary and secondary qualitative 
data concerning community action.  
 
The project as designed to build on previous ork on resilience and emerging community action in the 
context of climate change. The aim as to provide a solid base from hich to examine ho the concept 
of community resilience is being defined and used in different contexts (policy, practice and research); the 
factors that support or undermine capacities to build resilience at the community level; and the 
relationship beteen resilience and equity, social disadvantage and vulnerability. That is, questions of 
resilience ‘to hat’ (e.g. shocks or stresses), ‘of hat’ (e.g. communities, localities, etc.) and particularly ‘for 
hom’ (i.e. ho is likely to benefit, and ho may be excluded).  
 
To gain the necessary insight and deeper understanding about the approaches, relationships and 
processes at ork, the evidence revie dras on qualitative and quantitative data from the folloing 
sources: 
 
• Documentary evidence: an online search of documentary evidence. 
• Expert evidence: input from four expert advisors and 16 orkshop participants ith different fields 
of specialisation. 
• ction evidence: four case studies based on in-depth telephone intervies ith a minimum of to 
stakeholders in each case, alongside documentary analysis.  
 
Strategy for the online search of documentary 
evidence 
To ensure that the evidence revie dre on a comprehensive and balanced evidence base of relevance 
to the research questions, a dual approach as employed: the use of expert knoledge and 
understanding of key issues for this topic area, alongside a systematic search of electronic databases.  
 
Guided by the research questions and discussion at the inception meeting, the initial inclusion and 
exclusion criteria for evidence (outlined in ppendix 1) ere identified, to manage the search and develop 
a search string that as purposely restricted to produce relevant results. This included online searches of 
the folloing electronic databases: eb of Science, Scopus, Google and Google Scholar. longside this 
process, project advisors identified high-quality, core additional peer-revieed papers and grey literature. 
 
Quality assurance 
Good processes, including regular moderation, ere established to ensure that the project team took a 
consistent approach to applying inclusion and exclusion criteria, coding and revieing documents (EPPI-
Centre, 2010).  
 
Full text papers ere revieed against a set of quality assessment criteria (both quantitative and 
qualitative) developed by CEP, and the results recorded in a proforma (see ppendix 2). Only those 
documents chosen through the quality assessment criteria, and judged by the experts and project team 
to be most relevant, ere taken forard to use in the analysis and synthesis of evidence.  
 
The search strategy gathered 995 studies and these ere filtered don to 87. Exploration of the 
evidence and input from project advisors and orkshop participants resulted in a final 108 documents 
that ere quality assessed and included in the evidence revie (more details in ppendices 1–3). 
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Focusing the evidence 
The initial findings from the online search of documentary evidence, together ith input from the expert 
advisors and orkshop participants, provided a vie on the scale of action across the UK. This led the 
evidence revie and case studies to focus specifically on exploring community resilience through action 
on community energy (generation and efficiency), community flood risk management and community 
food groing. The revie of evidence found that the focus of documented examples of community 
actions to address the consequences of climate change in the UK is not evenly spread: more examples of 
community actions ere found relating to the three areas given above, but limited examples ere found 
relating to ater scarcity and heataves.  
 
Community actions in these areas combine a focus on the direct and indirect consequences of climate 
change. They offer the potential to explore distinctions beteen proactive and reactive community 
resilience to climate change, and issues around addressing shorter-term crises, or ‘shocks’, and  
longer-term, more enduring pressures, or ‘stresses’. For example:  
 
• Community flood risk management can build community resilience to prepare for the shock of a 
flood and to alleviate potential long-term stresses.  flood event itself is a shock, here preparatory 
actions can support responses and immediate recovery. But flooding ill also generate longer-term 
stresses, for example, relating to increases in the price of home insurance, impacts on housing 
markets and the effects on the health of people at risk of flooding, (particularly vulnerable and 
socially disadvantaged groups). Local actions are often linked to the short-term emergency response, 
but may also be able to play a role in addressing longer-term consequences.  
• For community energy generation and efficiency, local actions often seek to ensure energy system 
sustainability, to avoid longer-term stresses in terms of access to affordable energy or the effects of 
ongoing carbon reduction policies, hich could themselves generate shocks (such as a sudden fuel 
price increase). Community reneable energy projects also redistribute poer to consumers and 
provide a common solution to the stress of energy dependence on fossil fuels and decreasing 
supplies.  
• Community food groing actions can be framed as adaptation to stresses (e.g. a general increase in 
food prices due to crops abroad affected by climate change) and avoiding shocks over secure food 
supplies (e.g. the shock of an extreme eather event eradicating an entire staple crop and a related 
food price spike). Similarly to actions focused on community energy, local aims tend to be related to 
ensuring a sustainable and affordable local food supply. Community actions are not necessarily 
related to reducing carbon, questions over import/export reliance, or food security, although local 
food production could play a role in reducing the carbon emissions produced by transporting food, 
and arguably could also play a small contribution on these other aspects too. 
 
Case studies and intervies 
To complement the desk-based evidence revie, four case studies ere undertaken using telephone 
intervies and documentary analysis. The case studies profile practical, innovative and emerging 
community actions across the UK that involve citizens orking to develop resilience to climate change in 
relation to one or more of the three defined areas above (flood risk management, community energy and 
food groing). 
 
Case study identification 
 long list of case studies as generated from the online search of documentary evidence, input from 
advisors and presentations by participants in a orkshop organised by CEP in October 2014.2 Cases ere 
then assessed against the inclusion criteria presented in Table 1, to ensure the selected cases ould 
facilitate exploration of the key prerequisites, components, barriers and facilitators for building 
community resilience in the context of climate change. 
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Table 1: Inclusion criteria and the selected cases 
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Semi-structured intervies 
t least to semi-structured, in-depth telephone intervies ere conducted per case study site beteen 
16 and 28 January 2015, ith community members and practitioners actively involved in the delivery 
and/or management of each of the case examples. Intervie questions ere based around a schedule of 
common questions, to enable comparison across intervies. 
 
Data analysis 
In order to establish the range and balance of vies and the overall strength of evidence, the different 
strands of data collected (in-depth intervies, documents and case studies) ere examined in order to 
identify and extract the overarching themes of relevance to each research question.  
 
For further details of the four case studies, see Chapter 4. 
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4 The case studies in brief 
This section provides an overvie of the case studies that are dran-on throughout the report. See the 
separate Case studies of community resilience to climate change for the full text versions. 
 
Transition Heathro/Gro Heathro 
The aim of the Transition movement is to catalyse community action to relocalise economies, in order to 
make them resilient to the ‘tin threats’ of peak oil and climate change through the formation of local 
groups, called ‘Transition Initiatives’.  
 
Transition Heathro is one such initiative. The group’s Gro Heathro project is located on an ex-
market garden site in a village implicated by the potential expansion of Heathro irport. It as 
established by activists from the direct action organisation, Plane Stupid, folloing a 2009 Climate ction 
Camp. 
 
This case illustrates the nature of protest as a factor influencing resilience, and offers learning on ho 
community action to support resilience can be initiated by people from outside the local area. 
 
Figure 1: Gro Heathro site poster, London 
 
Source: Katya Brooks 
Norton community ind energy project 
In January 2010, a community-interest energy company based in York proposed the construction of a 
ne ‘community’ ind energy project in the parish of Norton, South Yorkshire. The electricity generated 
ould be sold to the National Grid, ith any profits going largely to a nely formed co-operative called 
Norton Energy Community (NEC), oned by Norton residents. These profits could only be spent on 
collective projects ithin the local area, ith a focus on protecting the environment and mitigating 
climate change. Since 2012, the project has remained stuck in the planning process for various reasons. 
 
This case therefore provides an example of a community action initiated by a company located outside 
the local area that has faced significant local opposition, and enables learning on the importance of 
community consultation and insider/outsider-led initiatives. 
 
Cynefin programme (Llanelli) 
The elsh Government-funded Cynefin programme as established in the ton of Llanelli in 2013.   
Llanelli is one of nine communities across ales that in hich Cynefin ‘Place Coordinators’ are orking 
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to encourage community groups, businesses and local authorities to ork together to make their 
communities cleaner, safer and better places to live.  
 
 central aim of Cynefin Llanelli has been to develop an emergency flood plan to empoer communities 
in the case of extreme eather events.  
 
This case provides an example of a project located in an area of climate vulnerability and social 
disadvantage. It illustrates a government-led model in hich targets are generated by the community. 
Therefore, it offers learning on ho less prescriptive, nationally led initiatives orking through local 
partnerships can develop community resilience. 
 
Figure 2: Cynefin programme street stall, ales 
 
Source: @CynefinLlanelli, 2014 
Liverpool Flood Resilience Community pathfinder 
Since May 2013, Liverpool City Council has been funded by Defra to run a Flood Resilience Community 
pathfinder (FRCP) project in Belle Vale ard, one of the most deprived ards in the country. Liverpool 
has a high risk of surface-ater flooding, and climate change is exacerbating the risk.  
 
The project involves flood resilience improvements to 32 properties next to Netherley Brook, and 
measures to raise aareness of climate change, flooding and community resilience across the oodlands 
Estate. Local businesses and residents (specifically, vulnerable residents) have been targeted. 
 
The case is an example of community action to improve community resilience to climate change that 
started ith social issues, and built on previous activities and community links. It offers learning on the 
role of community capital in local action, and ho nationally led initiatives can catalyse and develop this. 
 
Figure 3: Installing flood doors, Liverpool 
 
 
Source: Liverpool City Council  
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5 Considering resilience 
perspectives 
Box 2: Key messages on resilience as a concept  
 
• cross the policy, practice and academic landscape there are different definitions of resilience of 
communities to climate change. These are used across different contexts resulting in a variety of 
actions. Hoever, this concept can be summarised as: the ability of communities to reduce exposure 
to, prepare for, cope ith, recover better from, adapt and transform as needed, to the direct and 
indirect consequences of climate change, here these consequences can be both short-term shocks 
and longer-term stresses. 
 
• There is a distinction to be made beteen proactive and reactive resilience, ith the former 
emphasising adaptation and transformation to both shocks and stresses, and the latter focused 
on resistance and ‘bounce-back’ after a shock, ith less focus on underlying stresses. The former 
suggests a need to change existing conditions, hile the latter suggests a return to the status quo. 
 
• Currently, the policy focus in relation to community resilience is generally on responses to 
shocks associated ith the direct impacts of climate change, leading to an emphasis on 
emergency planning and the role of the community in relation to other institutions, particularly 
ith regard to flood risk management. Other areas of policy are directed toards indirect shocks 
and stresses relating to climate change but they are not framed as supporting community resilience. 
 
• The concept of community resilience to climate change is politically contested. It has been 
argued that the approach allos governments to shift the responsibility for actions to mitigate or 
adapt to climate change onto local communities, using communities as delivery agents, ithout 
providing adequate support and ithout consideration of the capacities of those communities. In 
contrast, some activists favour communities taking more poer and control themselves to develop 
climate resilience. 
 
• cademic and practitioner definitions/framings suggest a key component to building resilience 
generally is to understand and develop the adaptive and resilience capacities ithin a 
community.  capacities approach implies a need for community development, building on the assets 
that exist ithin communities, specifically community capital (relationships beteen people, 
netorks); institutional capacity (formal and informal together ith links ith citizens in 
communities); infrastructure (land, flood defences, energy generators); economic capacity (local 
economy, individual resources); and social capacity (abilities ithin the community e.g. education, 
mobility, language). 
 
• Hoever, resilience initiatives need to recognise uneven community capacities to respond and 
pre-existing vulnerabilities, as ell as the differing distributional impacts of climate change, hich 
may hinder communities’ ability to develop resilience. 
 
Introduction 
This section provides an overvie of theoretical approaches to resilience in the context of communities, 
disasters and climate change. It examines a number of key areas that are considered to be important 
components of the resilience of communities to climate change shocks and stresses. It outlines and 
analyses: 
 
• the concept of resilience; 
• a capacities approach to building resilience; 
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• the role of community engagement and governance; and 
• a frameork for examining actions.  
 
n overvie of the concept of resilience 
There is a plethora of definitions for ‘resilience’ used in the contexts of communities, disasters and 
systems (see Tigger-Ross et al., 2014 for a brief overvie). In relation to community resilience it has 
been commented that ‘despite groing interest and numerous pages being devoted to it, it lacks 
coherency, clarity and consistency of use’ and ‘there is a danger of the concept becoming an imprecise 
buzzord that loses potency’ (Young Foundation, 2012). Given this, it is important to discuss those 
different meanings and to understand ho they are being applied. 
 
s ell as the different contexts in hich the concept of resilience is being used, from climate change 
and environmental disasters to economic resilience in the context of austerity, there are different 
perspectives ithin the academic, policy and practice communities on hat the term means. To begin 
ith, this section sets out the development of the concept ithin the academic sphere, and this is 
folloed by discussions of its application by UK policy-makers and practitioners. 
 
cademic perspectives 
ithin the academic literature there has been increasing use of the term resilience particularly in relation 
to disaster management. uthors (e.g. rmitage et al., 2012; Cutter et al., 2008, 2010; Norris et al., 2008 
note the change in concept from a narro, engineering-based, structural definition of resilience to a 
more interdisciplinary concept focused on the interrelationship beteen social and ecological systems. 
That is, a focus on the human systems and processes that interact ith ecological processes. For 
example, there is a recognition in flood risk that the management of a river to reduce flooding requires 
understanding of both ho and here the river floods, as ell as ho people make decisions about 
planning and management ithin a flood plain. Generally, the term emerged in a range of different fields 
in the 1960s and 1970s, but has spread more idely since the 1980s. 
 
Table 2: Resilience concepts (adapted from rmitage et al., 2012)  
 
 
 
 
Much of that ork is located ithin a socio-ecological systems approach, hich takes concepts grounded 
in ecology. Resilience is conceptualised as a dynamic property of a system, enabling it to maintain its 
structure and function in the face of change.  
 
[...] a highly resilient system ould be able to maintain or recover key functions through 
transient and exogenous shocks. If a stress or disturbance does alter the ecosystem, then it 
should be able to bounce back quickly to resume its former ability to yield a service or utility 
rather than transform into a qualitatively different state that is controlled by a different set 
of processes.  
Dason et al., 2010 
 
Translating this to communities, this relates to social netorks and quality of life being maintained in the 
face of change, specifically direct and indirect climate change consequences.  
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Resilience-building strategies can be considered to be ‘reactive’ or ‘proactive’ (after Dovers and 
Handmer, 1992, and developed further in the context of flooding by Tigger-Ross et al., 2014 – see 
Box 3). 
Box 3: Reactive and proactive resilience 
 
Resilience as ‘resistance’: holding the line, preparing for the last disaster. This is useful hen it prepares 
people for a hazard, e.g. flood gates on houses, but not so useful hen the hazard is not as anticipated, 
e.g. overtopping of flood defences that overhelms flood gates, and no plan for evacuation. RECTIVE 
 
Resilience as ‘bounce-back’: getting back to normal. Useful in terms of an optimistic rhetoric. Not so 
useful because it can be unrealistic, and can lead to reproduction of vulnerabilities. For example, in an 
area that is prone to flooding, a reactive response may involve putting back the home exactly as it as, 
rather than installing some measures to minimise damage in a future flood (e.g. replacing carpet ith tiles 
or moving plugs up the alls). RECTIVE 
 
Resilience as ‘adaptation’: adjusting to a ne normal. ccepting that your orld has changed, hich 
should ensure that vulnerabilities are not reproduced. Can be hard for people to accept living ith 
hazards. Measures might include developing a household flood plan, joining a Flood Group, making sure 
vulnerable people are looked after in the local area. PROCTIVE 
 
Resilience as ‘transformation’: oning the need to change. Transforming to meet future threats. Radical 
change (physical, social, psychological, economic) in the face of current or future hazards, oned by 
individuals and communities (of all types). ctivities might include relocation of homes, restructuring 
institutions to be able to cope ith flooding, and alloing buildings to flood. PROCTIVE 
 
 reactive approach focuses on maintaining stability and the status quo, hereas proactive resilience 
focuses on change and adaptation. Interestingly, Castan Broto and Bulkeley (2013) in their extensive 
revie of climate change experiments/interventions in 100 cities across the orld find that, 
‘experimentation involves multiple forms of technical and social innovation. Despite the diversity of 
experiments, these do not alays challenge established ideas about the management of resources in the 
city.’ In the context of climate change interventions, it is still quite possible that experiments are focused 
on maintaining stability (hich in the long term may not be resilient), rather than taking a more proactive 
approach that looks forard to, and is able to adapt to, change and uncertainty. Furthermore, proactive 
resilience looks more toards addressing longer-term stresses, hereas the reactive approach focuses 
more on shocks.  
 
In the context of disasters, resilience is defined in terms of communities and individuals being able to 
prepare for and respond to the disaster. The Department for International Development (DFID, 2011a) 
revieed many types of resilience and has a orking definition in the context of disasters as:  
 
Disaster Resilience is the ability of countries, communities and households to manage 
change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses – 
such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict – ithout compromising their long-term 
prospects. 
 
DFID’s ork identifies four key elements to a resilience frameork: 
 
• the context – clarifying the focus of resilience (i.e. here, a community/place etc.); 
• the nature of the disturbance – i.e. to hat resilience is needed (e.g. floods/price rises); 
• capacities to deal ith this disturbance – affected by exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (see 
also Lindley et al., 2011, for application of these ideas in relation to climate impacts in the UK); and 
• reactions ith different possible outcomes – from bounce back to collapse (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: The four elements of a resilience frameork (from DFID, 2011a) 
 
 
 
DFID’s model captures aspects of resilience as a general dynamic property. Its framing tends toards 
consideration of extreme events, or shocks, rather than longer-term stresses, hich is not surprising 
given its origins ithin the disaster literature. 
 
In relation to this project, the system or process of interest is a geographical community. In terms of 
climate change, there are both shocks and stresses that can be mitigated as ell as adapted to, e.g. floods 
(shock) or a change in food prices due to crop failures overseas (stress). The capacity to deal ith the 
disturbance is an area discussed later in this report, but provides the idea that the existing system (e.g. a 
community) has resources and vulnerabilities that may be dran on and affected by any disturbance. 
Finally, the reaction to disturbances describes potentially different outcomes, both positive and negative. 
This definition also includes the concept of adaptation and hile it is not couched ithin climate change 
per se, rather disasters, it does provide a very useful link to the ork on adaptation and risk. 
 
This definition introduces to key areas of discussion: resilience ‘to hat’ and resilience ‘of hat’. 
 
Resilience to hat? 
Many of the systems definitions talk generally of disturbances, changes, stresses, etc. Much of the ork in 
the disaster literature has focused on resilience to natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes. ithin 
the disasters area, research has moved toards a more proactive approach ith the realisation that, ith 
climate change, the pattern of disasters is likely to change and so responses need to be focused on the 
future, rather than rooted in past events. 
 
In this report, the focus is on resilience to shocks and stresses caused by direct and indirect 
consequences of climate change, as noted in Chapter 2. Examples of these are shon in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Examples of direct and indirect consequences of climate change  
 
 
 
 
This classification is suggested, as it helps to identify hat consequences, policies and actions are focused 
on, e.g. flood action group (direct, shock); food groing project (indirect, stress). 
 
Resilience of hat/hom? 
Often hat or hom is to become resilient is unspecified, but in this revie there is a focus on resilience 
of communities, that is, the resilience of the community itself, in the sense of neighbourhood functioning 
and the collective ability of people to cope ith issues so that they can ithstand a range of generalised 
shocks and stresses. The term ‘community resilience’ is used in this context to mean the resilience of 
local people in a particular geographic setting.3  
 
Community resilience is a process linking a netork of adaptive capacities (resources ith 
dynamic attributes) to adaptation after a disturbance or adversity.  
Norris et al., 2008 
 
In the context of community energy projects, Gubbins (2010) defines community resilience as:  
 
[…] communities having the confidence, capability, resources, knoledge and skills to 
address adverse factors affecting their cohesion and development. These factors include 
dramatic events such as extreme eather events; energy cost spikes; blackouts and energy 
insecurity; and national financial crises; as ell as more chronic issues such as rural 
depopulation; fuel poverty; ageing communities; urban deprivation and unemployment. 
 
Some of this dras on transition approaches (Hopkins, 2011a) or systems theories, but is largely coming 
out of a community development perspective (ilding, 2011; Young Foundation, 2012; King, 2014). 
hat distinguishes it from the other framings is the focus on identifying and then building up aspects of 
communities so that they are able to cope ith change, sometimes climate change. hat remains as an 
empirical question is the extent to hich building resilience of communities in this generalised ay builds 
resilience to the direct and indirect consequences of climate change. 
 
Resilience as a contested concept 
s noted earlier, hoever, resilience is a contested concept (Henfrey and Kenrick, 2015; Bron, 2013; 
Hayard, 2013; Harrison, 2012).  positive framing of resilience, ith its suggestion that people can have 
agency in the face of difficulties, overemphasises the ability of those dealing ith shocks and stresses to 
be able to cope, and shifts responsibility for dealing ith crises aay from the state or those in poer.  
 
Resilience discourse emerged partly as a justified response to representations of people as 
‘helpless victims’. But vulnerability also signals inequalities in relations of poer. People are 
likely to be vulnerable as a result of their position in relation to others and that positioning 
needs to be central to policy approaches that aim to mitigate the effects of adversity or 
crisis.  
Harrison, 2012 
 
The risk of a resilience framing is that the costs of coping and the burden on some groups ithin the 
community, such as omen, are overlooked (Harrison, 2012). Using the concept of resilience can also 
depoliticise situations, as it inherently emphasises resilience of the state and the individual, hereas for 
transformations in society to happen, e.g. transition toards a lo-carbon economy, the political status 
quo ill have to be challenged (Hayard, 2013).  
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Looking across a number of definitions (see Norris et al., 2008 for an overvie), hat tends to be lacking 
in relation to climate change is the aspect of reducing exposure to direct and indirect shocks and 
stresses. The focus tends to be on responding, recovering and adapting. Beyond addressing direct 
consequences, such as floods, research tends to be framed around adaptation and mitigation, rather than 
resilience (e.g. Ingold et al., 2010, but Saavedra and Budd, 2009 for an exception). Hoever, more 
recently debates have emerged around the concepts of both resilience and vulnerability in relation to 
climate change (see Maru et al., 2014 for discussion). It is clear there is an ongoing debate around the 
definition, use and value of the concept of resilience. This could be linked to the current lack of robust 
data to test out the definitions and theories that have been developed.  
 
Lastly, the vast majority of the available literature on the resilience concept still tends to be 
largely conceptual and, hile some empirical examples are discussed, there remains a lack of 
robust case studies that prove or test the theories put forard.  
Bahadur et al., 2010 
 
Hoever, community action on climate change can be examined in relation to resilience building by 
exploring ho those involved frame resilience, through questions prompted by the revie (e.g. are they 
reactive/proactive in approach, are they addressing a specific shock or stress, are they focused on the 
hole community, and do their attempts at engagement reach everyone?). The approach to the case 
studies and other material on practice in this report attempts to do this, and generate some lessons. 
 
Policy perspectives 
The term ‘resilience’ has entered into common use ithin the orld of disaster management in general 
over the past to decades. It gained increased prominence after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and began to 
be used by the UK Government in relation to emergencies ith the publication of the Civil Contingencies 
ct (2004). Local Resilience Fora ere formed as a requirement of the ct, comprising key emergency 
responders and specific supporting agencies. It came to prominence specifically ith respect to flooding 
after the 2007 floods, hen approximately 48,000 households and nearly 7,300 businesses ere 
flooded (Pitt, 2007). Folloing the floods, the Cabinet Office developed a National Strategic Frameork 
for Community Resilience (2011). This ork and subsequent definitions are focused on resilience in the 
context of emergencies. 
 
The definition of resilience as ‘the capacity of an individual, community or system to adapt in order to 
sustain an acceptable level of function, structure, and identity’, as provided by the Cabinet Office (2011), 
is the most idely recognised and adopted definition found on the ebsites and reports of different 
government departments (Defra, DCLG and DECC). It has also been taken up ithin Scotland and ales, 
and approaches to encouraging preparedness for emergencies ithin the general population have been 
developed.4  
 
There is also a definition of community resilience ithin the National Strategic Frameork for 
Community Resilience: 
 
Community resilience is about communities using local resources and knoledge to help 
themselves during an emergency in a ay that complements the local emergency services.  
Cabinet Office, 2011 
 
This puts an emphasis on people in communities taking responsibility and orking ith emergency 
services in an emergency situation. It is clearly positioned as part of the UK Government’s ‘Big Society’ 
agenda: ‘This programme is part of the Government’s Big Society commitment to reduce the barriers 
hich prevent people from being able to help themselves and to become more resilient to shocks’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2011). s discussed earlier, this framing is also regarded by some as a ay of pursuing a 
reduction in the role and remit of the state, and putting more responsibilities and burdens onto the 
individual and communities.  
 
ithin the context of addressing specific hazards, such as flood risk in the UK, a relatively narro 
definition can be discerned in the Making space for ater strategy document (Defra, 2004), focused on 
the resistance and resilience of buildings. It is in the Pitt revie (2007) after the 2007 floods that the 
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term becomes used more idely, in relation to ‘critical infrastructure’ and also ‘personal and community 
resilience’.  
 
Resilience – the ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to ithstand the 
consequences of an incident.  
Community resilience – the ability of a local community to prepare for emergencies and to 
respond and recover from them.  
Pitt, 2007 
 
In the context of climate change, the National daptation Programme (NP)(Defra, 2013) uses the term 
resilience in three key ays: ‘climate resilience’; ‘resilience of’, e.g. infrastructure and buildings’; and 
‘resilience to’, e.g., flooding, ildfires etc. The definition provided in the glossary is as follos: 
 
Resilience – describes the ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances 
hile retaining the same basic ays of functioning, and a capacity to adapt to stress and 
change  
Defra, 2013 
 
This links in ith the Cabinet Office definition, but includes adaptation to stresses. Even so, the emphasis 
of the NP is on becoming resilient to the direct consequences of climate change, and it focuses on 
shocks rather than stresses. There is no consideration of the indirect consequences of climate change 
(for example, its effects on the costs of living) and little attempt to address stresses, both of hich ould 
require greater links ith, and consideration of, building a lo-carbon society. The focus is on the 
resilience of a ide range of entities, from buildings through to communities, and in terms of 
reactive/proactive it sits beteen the bounce-back and the adaptation approaches. hat is really evident, 
hoever, is ho the implementation of the programme relies almost entirely on voluntary actions, 
specifically ith respect to local government, hich suggests limits to hat might be achievable at a 
national level through this programme. For example, ith respect to vulnerable groups, it suggests that: 
‘Effective solutions on ho to support vulnerable groups should therefore be found and led by the local 
community or local council, ith voluntary groups playing an important role’ (Defra, 2013). 
 
DFID has the most comprehensive definition of resilience, ith not only a definition but also a 
frameork, ith different components as outlined in the previous section. DFID (2011b) uses this to 
inform its approach to supporting countries to be better prepared for, ithstand and rapidly recover from 
shocks such as earthquakes, drought, etc. To ‘build resilience to disasters and conflict’ is the second 
Policy Goal of the UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy (DFID, 2011c). ithin that Policy Goal is the 
recognition of the differential and disproportionate impacts of disasters: 
 
Disasters affect people differently. The poor are disproportionately impacted upon. omen, 
children, older and disabled people, and politically marginalised and oppressed groups are 
often more exposed to risks, and usually have less capacity to defend themselves from the 
impact of a disaster. Understanding these varying dynamics ill enable us to take the 
specific needs of such groups into account hen planning and implementing resilience 
ork.  
DFID, 2011c 
 
The recognition of the differential impacts is vital to ensuring that community resilience action does not 
reproduce existing inequalities and vulnerabilities, ansering, to some extent, the critiques of the 
concept. In taking a capacities approach, hich is discussed later in this report, there is the potential both 
to understand existing societal vulnerabilities and to design approaches to resilience that reduce those 
vulnerabilities, as ell as develop ne capacities for managing change. Ensuring that an analysis of the 
differential impacts of climate change is part of any approach to resilience ill be vital to its longer-term 
success. 
 
Overall, it is clear that the concept of resilience has permutated through the UK Government and is 
being used in a variety of contexts, ith each definition sharing core aspects but ith slightly different 
emphases. The main focus is on resilience to specific shocks, both climate change-related (e.g. floods, and 
to a lesser extent heataves) and non-climate change-related (e.g. industrial action). The shocks 
highlighted are usually of short-term duration. s ell as this, the definitions focus on the resilience of a 
ide range of entities: buildings, communities, households, infrastructure, etc. Hoever, emergency 
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events are not necessarily described in the context of climate change overall. Given the lead from the 
Cabinet Office, ith their focus on risks, events such as floods and heataves are considered in the 
National Risk Register (NRR) in relation to all potential risks to the UK, e.g. terrorist attacks.5 The 
exception to this is ithin the NP, here emergency events are located ithin the context of climate 
change, but it is unclear hat relation this might have ith the NRR. ithout a ider framing of these 
events ithin a changing climate, resilience is likely to remain focused on maintaining the status quo 
rather than adapting to future change.  
 
Further, the focus on vulnerability is narroed to a focus on vulnerable groups, i.e. those ho are 
specifically vulnerable to certain consequences (e.g. older people, people on lo incomes and people ith 
health risks). In reality this focus is on vulnerable individuals and ho to ensure they are identified ithin a 
community and taken care of in an emergency. It does not address issues of lack of capacity more 
generally ithin communities. The DFID approach is an exception to this, but the focus of that is on 
overseas development and not UK resilience. 
 
Practitioner perspectives 
The term ‘practitioners’ is used here to refer to organisations such as charities that are engaged in or 
advising on practical actions in local communities (e.g. Young Foundation, Carnegie Trust, The 
Conservation Volunteers (TCV)). For this group, community resilience is a idely-used term, and hile 
some esche a specific definition (ilding, 2011), it broadly refers to the sense of neighbourhood 
functioning and the collective ability of people to cope ith issues, such that they can ithstand a range 
of shocks and stresses (be those economic, social, political or environmental), and echoes academic 
definitions of community resilience. Hoever, it is in marked contrast to the Cabinet Office’s definition of 
community resilience, hich focuses on the role that members of the community can play in supporting 
first responders during an emergency.  
 
Overall, practitioner perspectives focus on the resilience of something, often communities, largely ith 
respect to general shocks and stresses, and rarely relate to specific concerns due to climate change – 
ith the exception being the Transition movement, and to a lesser extent TCV. These perspectives are 
introduced in the folloing paragraphs. 
 
The Transition Netork has used the term community resilience since the organisation as founded by 
permaculture designer Rob Hopkins in 2006. In The transition companion: making your community more 
resilient in uncertain times (2011a), Rob Hopkins states: 
 
Making a community more resilient, if vieed as the opportunity for an economic and social 
renaissance, for a ne culture of enterprise and reskilling, should lead to a healthier and 
happier community hile reducing its vulnerability to risk and uncertainty…. Resilience is 
reframed as a historic opportunity for a far-reaching rethink.  
 
Therefore, the Transition Netork is clearly seeking to build proactive resilience practices. For example:  
 
Setting up a food hub to create viable links beteen local producers and consumers, adding 
infrastructure for local food processing (such as Transition Norich’s ne community mill), 
creating urban food production and identifying ne sites for that, mapping local food sheds 
and supporting small farmers, setting up Community Supported griculture systems, all 
build food resilience and a community’s ability to respond in an emergency much more than 
food stockpiles, but also have very beneficial impacts on the local economy too.  
Hopkins, 2011b 
 
The transition companion (Hopkins, 2011a) develops these ideas further. Here, Hopkins states that 
‘adaptability is at the heart of resilience’, but that it is more than ‘sustaining current models and practices. 
Rather, in the light of ‘energetic precariousness’, it becomes a rethink of assumptions about 
infrastructure and systems that should lead to a more sustainable, resilient and enriching lo-carbon 
economy.’ He argues here that the resilience that the Transition movement is seeking is to peak oil, 
climate change and ‘the precarious economic situation’, because the Netork sees these as the greatest 
risks facing communities.  
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The Transition Movement emphasises not only the building-up of community ith ne skills and 
capacities, but also the longer-term goal of responding to peak oil and climate change challenges. 
Interestingly, given its adherence to affecting change by providing an alternative to the status quo, rather 
than directly challenging it through political channels, it has the unintended potential to reinforce some 
of the messages around passing responsibilities from the state onto communities. Hoever, there are 
also activists ithin the Transition movement ho favour putting greater poer and control into 
community hands in a more challenging ay.  
 
TCV employs the definition of community resilience developed by the Canadian Centre for Community 
Reneal in the late 1990s: ‘ resilient community is one that takes intentional action to enhance the 
personal and collective capacity of its citizens and institutions to respond to the course of social, 
economic and environmental change’ (King, 2014). TCV’s focus is on reclaiming green spaces and 
through their netork of over 1,000 community groups, local green spaces are transformed into green 
gyms, nature reserves and playgrounds. Their interest in community resilience comes through the 
recognition that people orking together in a specific place develop bonds and netorks that could be 
used in an emergency situation, that volunteering to reclaim green space has ider community benefits. 
hile climate change is referred to in passing, the focus is on ho TCV groups might respond in 
emergencies, but alongside that, the act of reclaiming green space for environmental benefits ill often 
mean it has a positive mitigation role in relation to climate change, e.g. ensuring areas for shade to 
protect people from heat, and enabling space for ater to soak aay, reducing flooding.  
 
The majority of TCV initiatives aim to have a positive transformative effect on community resilience and 
adaptation to climate change, but tend to be funded as health and community initiatives. Hoever, TCV’s 
community groups have been involved in a ide range of primarily reactive community resilience 
activities, including helping the community deal ith extreme eather events like flooding, high inds and 
snofall; and creating long-term natural flood defences.  
 
TCV identified four key attributes common to their community groups that make a group effective in 
responding to ne resilience challenges: 
 
1. ctivity – “The more often you do something the better you get at it and the more skills that are 
developed”; 
2. Self-organisation – “The ability of groups to run their on affairs and not rely on external input, 
hich might not be there in a ‘resilience situation’”; 
3. Connectedness – “Knoing ho to turn to hen needing or offering help”; 
4. Skills and knoledge – “Most of hat you need to kno and do as a volunteer is transferable to 
other situations”. 
King, 2014 
 
This approach discusses ho a community that is resilient to a range of changes might act. There is a 
proactive and intentional aspect to it, as ell as the idea of developing the capacities of citizens and 
institutions. The key thing that distinguishes this approach from the dominant Cabinet Office definition 
of resilience is the focus on building-up community and individual capacities in order to cope better ith 
a range of changes, not just emergencies. This complements the focus on developing specific knoledge 
and skills around coping in emergencies, the idea of having a solid basis from hich to reach out to deal 
ith the extraordinary. It also links to broader notions of community development as a basis for resilience 
building, hich is discussed later in this report. 
 
Capacities approach to building resilience 
There are a number of authors (e.g. Cutter et al., 2010; Norris et al., 2008; Young Foundation, 2012; 
Middlemiss and Parrish, 2010; Cinderby et al., 2014) coming from both the disasters and community 
development literature ho elaborate on the type and category of capacity/resource/asset required to 
develop resilience of a community to a range of shocks and stresses. Cinderby et al. (2014), in the 
context of an intervention to build a local community’s capacity to adapt to ongoing economic, 
environmental and social changes, express it ell: ‘The capacity of a neighbourhood for resilience can be 
assessed and derived from the range of assets upon hich the community living in that location can dra 
for adaptive processes.’ 
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The Young Foundation provides a good description of the possible resources needed to make a 
community resilient to general shocks and stresses (ith an emphasis on economic stresses):  
 
Our understanding of community resilience is made up of a number of features 
incorporating cultural, human, political, financial and social resources. These may include 
‘hard’ assets such as good transport links, access to services and amenities. lso important 
are local buildings, organisations that enable communities to come together, alloing 
people to access support and to have their voices heard in relation to local issues. It includes 
‘softer’ assets such as relationships ith family, friends, neighbours, colleagues and the 
support of the ider community. It encompasses links ith voluntary and state organisations 
and the private sector. Most importantly, it not simply about exhorting communities to ‘pull 
themselves together’ but about giving them the capacity to identify assets and utilise them.  
Young Foundation, 2012 
 
In addition, Norris et al. (2008) use the idea of resources ith their definition of community resilience to 
a ‘disturbance’. Their focus is not on climate change impacts or transition toards a lo-carbon 
economy, but has been used ithin the disaster literature. 
 
Cutter et al.’s (2010) set of resilience categories comes out of their DROP model of resilience6 (and 
dras on the Norris et al., 2008 ork). It focuses on factors that can be measured in order to assess the 
impact of an intervention on reducing the consequences of disasters (specifically considering floods, 
hurricanes, drought and earthquakes). hile they do not explicitly discuss this in the context of climate 
change, their ork dras on global environmental change literature. Their set of categories is used to 
measure a baseline of resilience for a community, hich could then be measured after a disaster. This 
type of resilience is termed ‘inherent resilience’, as it is hat exists prior to any disaster. 
 
Finally, Middlemiss and Parrish (2010), ithin the frameork ooots initiatives for lo-carbon 
communities, provide a useful discussion of the necessary capacities dran on by individuals and 
communities in order for them to make changes toards lo-carbon communities. This therefore 
combines the capacities approach ith a focus on the development of specific knoledge, skills and 
practice to address climate change.  
 
Middlemiss and Parrish (2010) also suggest that different grassroots initiatives ill activate different 
capacities. For example, improving your energy saving behaviour ould be increasing personal capacity. 
Some actions aim at changes that give people the ability to take on more responsibility for sustainable 
actions. They also discuss ho the development of one capacity can interact ith other capacities, hich 
is something that is important and not really considered formally by other authors.  
 
Table 4 summaries some of the literature on capacities and the particular aspects of this identified as 
important in different contexts. 
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Table 4: Overvie of capacity approaches to resilience 
 
 
 
 
The value of taking a capacities approach in general is to-fold: 
 
• first, it enables a greater understanding of the building blocks of resilience, hich in turn should allo 
assessment of here strengths and eaknesses are present; and 
• second, resources for dealing ith shocks, e.g. floods, gro out of existing resources, so resilience 
building becomes a much ider task than just dealing ith a single event – it is about building more 
sustainable livelihoods for all. 
 
The implication of this ork for understanding community resilience to climate change is that if these 
capacities are built up, then communities ill be able to respond to and recover from the direct and 
indirect effects of climate change, and adapt toards becoming lo-carbon communities. In order to 
kno that this is happening in practice, e ould need to see ho a community actually responds in the 
face of a threat, and also measure ho far it is moving toards a lo-carbon society. Unfortunately, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, evidence in this area is patchy and frequently not characterised in terms of 
resilience. 
 
The role of community engagement and governance 
There is a suggestion that successfully building community resilience to general shocks and stresses has 
community engagement,7 empoerment and development at its heart. Hoever, as the definitions of 
these concepts are contested, there are different interpretations of hat they mean and ho they can 
be put into practice in building resilience in the context of climate change.  
 
The term ‘empoerment’ is often used in the context of community-based regeneration 
here involvement of local populations in the regeneration process is seen as ‘empoering’. 
Generally, this is seen as a rebalancing of poer beteen the state sector and the 
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community and voluntary sectors, and is linked to intentions of promoting community-led 
change.  
damson and Bromiley, 2008 
 
Other useful approaches to describing the range of public participation approaches include those from 
the International ssociation of Public Participation (2007) and ilcox (1994). There are many 
documents concerned ith community engagement and participation, providing techniques and 
approaches for engaging ith communities both from ithin and outside those communities. Brodie et al. 
(2011) provide a comprehensive revie of the factors that affect participation in community action. 
Participation is shaped by a multitude of factors that shift in significance over time, and are in turn shaped 
by the impact of participation itself. These factors operate at different levels: 
 
• individual, including motivations, personality, identity and resources; 
• relationships and social netorks, including an individual’s family, friends, neighbours, colleagues and 
ider social netorks; 
• groups and organisations, through hich people participate, including their structures, processes and 
culture; 
• local environment and place, including local spaces, events, institutions and politics; and 
• ider societal and global influences. 
 
Many papers revieed (e.g. maru and Chhetri, 2013; Ebi and Semenza, 2008; Hurlimann et al., 2014) 
highlight the need for the involvement of communities in order for climate change actions to be carried 
out. 
 
In addition, there are papers on understanding hat makes successful community organisation in the 
context of climate change resilience, including studies of local groups in the Transition Movement. The 
concept of grassroots innovations defined as ‘netorks of activists and organisations generating novel 
bottom-up solutions for sustainable development’ (Seyfang and Smith, 2007) is used by Feola and Nunes 
(2014) in their examination of the Transition Netork. They look at the success factors associated ith 
transition initiatives using data from a survey of 276 initiatives orldide, summarising that, ‘Success is 
defined along the lines of social connectivity and empoerment, and external environmental impact. Less 
successful transition initiatives might underestimate the importance of contextual factors and material 
resources in influencing success’. In their analysis of the survey results, Feola and Nunes establish a 
statistical correlation beteen the success of the Transition initiatives and their ability to co-operate or 
act in partnership ith other organisations and local actors. Feola and Nunes’ focus, hoever, is on hat 
helps to sustain a Transition group over time, therefore providing some evidence on hat makes a 
community group resilient or enduring, but not on hether Transition is contributing more idely to 
community resilience to climate change, or hether it is finding effective ays to engage or empoer 
communities. 
 
Larsen and Gunnarsso-Ostling (2009) use scenarios to argue for citizen participation, but suggest that 
there are tensions ‘beteen sustainability content values, such as reduced climate impact, and more 
process-oriented values such as legitimacy, learning and participatory scenario construction’. This 
highlights the conflicting relationship beteen needing to achieve certain goals quickly, in order to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change, and the approach to engagement that is bottom-up and process-
oriented, and can take time.  
 
Different types of governance structure can enable or hinder the development of community resilience 
to climate change. This revie particularly examines ho partnerships beteen citizens and other 
institutions/organisations support resilience. They may have central or local government funding and be 
more or less netorked into ider institutions of governance (public sector, private sector, voluntary 
sector). The role of differing governance approaches in supporting resilience is discussed later in this 
report. 
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Frameork for examining actions 
The initial revie of evidence here provides the basis for a frameork for understanding the extent to 
hich community resilience to climate change is emerging in practice, hich ill be considered in the 
folloing sections. Three aspects ill be considered: 
 
• the extent to hich different community capacities are being developed; 
• the nature of resilience (hether proactive or reactive); and  
• the extent of community engagement and nature of governance involved. 
 
First, e suggest the concept of capacities/resources is key. The report ill examine the extent to hich 
building up general capacities does help to build resilience in specific contexts, e.g. to flooding, but also 
hether building up specific resources, e.g. around flood risk resilience, also feeds back into other areas 
such as community capital. The report dras on the Cutter et al. (2010) frameork, hich captures a 
ide range of aspects regarded as important to building the resilience of communities to both general 
and specific shocks and stresses. Box 4 presents the different capacities and ho this frameork might 
be applied and used to assess emerging practice. 
 
Box 4: Frameork of resilience (adapted from Cutter et al., 2010) 
 
Social: Covers community demographic context, e.g. age, number of people in household, disability, level 
of education, etc. For different climate change consequences, different variables ill affect levels of 
existing vulnerability. ctions targeted at specific groups, e.g. supporting older people in flood risk areas 
and providing educational opportunities through food groing projects, could help to build social 
resilience. 
 
Economic: This focuses on the variables that give an indication of economic capacity, e.g. employment, 
home-onership and income levels. ctions that provide an income for local people, e.g. community 
energy projects and food groing projects, or that reduce costs, e.g. by providing cheaper energy or 
food, could support resilience.  
 
Institutional: This covers institutional arrangements and experience, both formal and informal, that exist 
in a place relating to management of flood risk and other direct or indirect consequences of climate 
change. ctions to establish groups (e.g. in relation to flood risk) that facilitate citizen engagement ith 
local institutional arrangements, and actions that engage citizens both in orking ith and challenging 
existing structures to address climate change and move toards a lo-carbon society, are relevant.  
 
Infrastructure: This refers to the type of infrastructure needed to facilitate responses to climate change, 
for example: space for community flood stores; flood defences at the local level (e.g. demountable 
defence, property level protection); and solar panels, local ind turbines and space for groing food, etc. 
 
Community capital: This includes the existing social netorks and relationships ithin the local area, e.g. 
knoing neighbours, informal help given/received, participation in active community groups, etc. 
Evidence suggests this is the ‘glue’ that keeps communities together, and provides the foundations upon 
hich community resilience can be built. 
 
Second, evidence of community action that promotes reactive or proactive resilience ill be examined. It 
may seem intuitive to suggest that actions focused on reactive resilience are ‘bad’ for longer-term 
adaptation to climate change, because there may be little acknoledgement of change or orientation 
toards a future threat. It is likely to be a more nuanced picture, ith both reactive and proactive actions 
running alongside each other. For example, hile flood defences are about resistance, they can be 
designed to ithstand future flooding, thereby building in adaptation. It might be that hat is important is 
to frame strategies as proactive resilience, but recognising that ithin that there may ell be some 
actions that appear more reactive.  
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Third, e ill examine community engagement and multi-level governance. The evidence suggests that 
this is vital to ensure actions are oned at the local level, but also plugged in to ider, more formal, 
netorks to facilitate long-term sustainability.  
 
Finally, in considering the actions being carried out to address climate change and move toards a lo-
carbon society, e ill also reflect on to key critiques of taking a resilience approach: 
 
• that it allos governments to shift the responsibility for action to mitigate or adapt to climate change 
onto local communities, using communities as delivery agents ithout providing adequate support 
and ithout consideration of the capacities of those communities; and 
• that it shifts the focus aay from those ho are climate vulnerable and actions to reduce that 
vulnerability, together ith avoiding questions about hy that vulnerability exists in the first place, 
and so ignores important issues of poer and politics. 
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6 The ider vie: emerging 
practice that supports community 
resilience to climate change 
Box 5: Key messages on emerging practice 
 
•  lack of monitoring and evaluation around the outcomes of community initiatives limits 
evidence, learning and guidance for future actions. 
 
• Community action related to climate change in the UK is diverse, yet patchy, and fragmented in 
nature. It is difficult to capture and produce a comprehensive account of all emerging practice: 
community groups and projects vary vastly in size, formality and stage of development, and the 
number and nature of initiatives is not static; indeed it is constantly in flux. 
  
• Community resilience is a contested, controversial and little-used concept in the context of 
local action on climate change. Hoever, in using it ithin this evidence revie to examine examples 
of community action, it has provided a useful lens on ho far actions may ultimately be supporting 
communities in responding to the direct and indirect consequences of climate change. 
 
• Direct experience of climate change consequences is a motivator for action. For example, the 
main catalyst to galvanise community participation and development of local flood action groups is 
the occurrence and experience of a flood event. 
 
This section explores ho much community action is going on in the UK, hich is attempting to build 
resilience to climate change explicitly or sometimes implicitly. It also looks at ho actions are being 
framed, ho the concepts of community resilience are used and hat is being done in practice. It notes 
the extent to hich issues of social disadvantage, equity and vulnerability are being addressed, and 
assesses practice using the five resilience categories used by Cutter et al. (2010): social, economic, 
institutional, infrastructure and community capital. 
 
Limited evidence 
Community actions relating to climate change comprise a ide range of initiatives ith varying goals and 
perspectives. Despite this diversity, it is important to first acknoledge that there is limited evidence and 
formal evaluation around these actions, particularly in relation to community flood risk management and 
energy actions. For example, a DECC (2013) report summarising current evidence on community energy 
projects revieed 25 studies to conclude that, ‘the evidence base is limited and does not provide a 
complete picture of current activity in the UK’. Similarly, Tigger-Ross et al. (2014) state that there are 
to good reasons hy flood risk interventions are not evaluated: 
 
• Flood resilience is an applied, complex area ith multiple actors and variables, hich means that 
establishing causal relationships (e.g. beteen increased aareness and change in individual actions) is 
not straightforard. 
• Flood risk resilience is an emerging, interdisciplinary area of study and has not moved into a more 
hypothesis-testing phase of ork.  
 
The Defra Flood Resilience Community pathfinder (FRCP) and its evaluation ill provide a significant 
body of ork in relation to flood risk resilience for future actions and evaluations to build on.  
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ith respect to food groing, the revie of the evidence has identified a number of evaluations of 
community food projects (including: Plunkett Foundation, 2012; Matthes and Pratt, 2012; Brook 
Lyndhurst and Ecometrica, 2011; Kiran et al., 2011) that could provide some indication on the drivers 
of action, even though their main objectives ere other than ‘building community resilience to climate 
change’. This is discussed further in Chapter 7.  
 
Overall, the lack of evaluation of current practices hinders comparative learning. 
 
The current picture of community action 
The search strategy for the evidence revie as designed to capture evidence related to the 
consequences of climate change in general. hile people in the UK may have experienced a range of 
climate change consequences, the focus of documented examples and revies of community actions is 
not evenly spread. In particular, limited evidence as found on community actions to address ater 
scarcity and heataves; more evidence exists around flood risk management, energy (efficiency and 
generation) and food groing. This may reflect the areas ith hich UK citizens have the most 
experience and here responses are more formally organised, perhaps due to policy drivers and the 
perceived immediacy or severity of the consequence, feasibility, capacity and/or necessity to act. For 
example, UK citizens may not feel an immediate threat is posed by the direct shock of heataves, and 
therefore taking action may not seem necessary. Nonetheless, during a heatave community responses 
to support each other, in some form, are likely. It is not yet common for community actions beyond 
flooding, food and energy to be formally organised or documented in the UK. There is a difference in 
levels of action, and this provides an uneven picture of action across the UK. 
 
Painting by numbers: the scale of community action 
Figure 5 visualises the scale of community action across the UK related to the areas of focus, as 
identified by the evidence revie and case studies: 
 
• Community energy groups: 5,000 community groups across the UK (ith projects in various stages 
of development since 2008 as identified by DECC (2014).  
• Community flood risk management groups: 221 groups affiliated ith the National Flood Forum 
(NFF)(160 across England and ales) as ell as the Scottish Flood Forum (61). 
• Community food groing: 5,149 individual food projects of varying sizes supported by: Local Food 
(500), community food enterprises supported by the Plunkett Foundation (1,600), community 
gardens in the UK supported by the Federation of City Farms and Community Gardens (1,000), 
communal groing spaces in London supported by the Capital Groth project (1,962), Community 
Supported griculture (CS) schemes (80), or communities funded by the Scottish Government’s 
Climate Challenge Fund (7).  
• Transition movement: 400 community groups affiliated ith the Transition movement in the UK. 
 
It must be noted that community groups may overlap across areas of activity (e.g. a group identified 
under the category of the Transition movement may also be included under the category of community 
food groing, if this is a focus of the group’s ork), and the numbers here only give an indication of 
scope. 
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Figure 5: Overvie of active community action in the UK, based on evidence 
revieed for the project 
 
 
 
 
The most likely explanation for the high number of examples in the evidence base on community food 
groing and energy efficiency and generation is that related community actions are motivated by 
multiple drivers, and address shocks and stresses beyond climate change, including saving money. This 
ould also explain hy the numbers shon in Figure 5 for community energy and community food 
groing initiatives in the UK are far greater than those orking on community flood risk management.  
 
Defra’s climate change risk assessment projections (2012a) identified flooding as the UK’s most pressing 
climate risk. Flooding is clearly an issue ith hich UK citizens have, and ill continue to have, increasing 
experience. It is orth noting that quantifying the number of community groups orking on community 
resilience to flooding across the UK is problematic. This is primarily due to the difficulty in defining a 
‘flood group’ as they tend to operate under a ide range of names and associations. For example, some 
may call themselves residents’, neighbourhood, community or emergency groups.  
 
Developing community resilience in the context of climate change is a process.  patchork of projects 
and activities build community capacities and netorks, as ell as support and achieve specific outcomes 
and impacts. From the evidence, a key and unansered question is the extent to hich community and 
climate change actions and agendas connect, and hether, for example, a community flood group could 
also take action on other climate change impacts. 
 
The picture frame: is community resilience being used? 
It as difficult to find examples in the evidence base here community climate change actions are 
explicitly framed as resilience-building activities in the research, or by community organisations. The 
evidence revie has found community actions related to climate change to be more commonly framed 
as, and driven by, improving community sustainability or self-sufficiency. For example, DECC’s evidence 
revie Community energy in the UK (2014) and Lo carbon communities challenge: evaluation report 
(2012) make no mention of resilience or community resilience. Hoever, the evaluators of the Scottish 
Government’s Carbon Challenge Fund identified an underlying belief that activities ould contribute to 
building community capacities, resilience and longer-term sustainability: ‘Many of the project managers 
hope that the connections made ill increase community capacity and resilience, and be of benefit in the 
future’ (Brook Lyndhurst and Ecometrica, 2011).  
 
The majority of examples identified by this evidence revie related to food groing do employ the term 
‘resilience’, but their aims are rarely linked to climate change. Hoever, this term has been used in this 
project to examine examples of practice, and to assess ho far action is increasing community capacities 
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and ho far actions may ultimately be building resilience to the direct and indirect consequences of 
climate change. hile popular in some academic fields (e.g. ithin disaster management and 
development) and ithin policy (e.g. Defra’s FRCP scheme), it seems that the idea of resilience has not 
been a core driver for action in climate change at the community level. There are exceptions, such as 
some national funders/infrastructure organisations of community action (e.g. TCV, Big Lottery Fund), as 
ell as the Transition movement hich aims ‘to inspire, encourage, connect, support and train 
communities as they self-organise around the Transition model, creating initiatives that rebuild resilience 
and reduce CO2 emissions’ (Transition Netork, 2014a). From the evidence, it is not clear hether the 
Transition movement has a vie on emergency-related resilience. 
 
In focus: community action on flood risk management 
The evidence indicates that there is currently more community action that supports climate change 
mitigation than adaptation across the UK. lthough, as Matthes and Pratt (2012) suggest, ‘many 
mitigation activities ill have implications for community adaptation. This may be because of a perceived 
focus on emergency planning hich is seen as the responsibility of Local uthorities and Emergency 
services.’ Historically, this has certainly been the case ithin flood risk management in the UK, hich 
emphasises a more reactive resilience, and here the community role is normally developed in the 
context of supporting emergency response. hile the rhetoric and some practices are changing, 
engineering solutions to flood and coastal erosion risk management still dominate. These may not be 
sustainable in the face of long-term climate change.  
 
The current context is one of shifting responsibilities to the local level through a number of governance 
mechanisms that have been implemented since the Pitt revie (2007), through the Floods and ater 
Management ct 2010. This led to the creation of Lead Local Flood uthorities (LLFs). LLFs are 
tasked ith the development of strategy for flood risk management in their areas, for maintaining a 
register of flood risk assets, and for managing the risk of flooding from surface ater, groundater and 
ordinary atercourses. s ell as this clear devolution of responsibility to the local level for strategy and 
management of floods, there have been significant developments ith respect to funding. In 2011, Defra 
announced a ne partnership approach to funding for flood risk management that aimed to: 
 
[…] allo more schemes to go ahead and to give each community more of a say in hat is 
done to protect them……Instead of meeting the full costs of just a limited number of 
projects, the ne approach could make Government money available toards any 
orthhile scheme over time.  
Defra, 2011 
 
Both these actions are consistent ith the localism agenda. 
 
In addition, there has been a significant move ithin UK flood risk management toards the recognition 
of the value of community engagement and community level-responsibility in flood responses:  
 
The discussion to this point reveals a fairly significant ‘social turn’ in UK FCRM [flood and 
coastal risk management] in the past to decades, aay from an emphasis almost solely on 
structural flood defence measures and toards an understanding that social and 
institutional processes, including community engagement, and community-level 
responsibility have an important, non-structural role in helping people to live ith flooding 
and to make communities more resilient to the impacts of flooding hen it occurs.  
Nye et al., 2011 
 
There is some evidence in relation to community flood risk management actions but fe have been 
formally evaluated. To date, the main evaluation of a flood resilience community resilience programme is 
that of Defra’s to-year FRCP scheme. Evidence from this initiative is examined belo. 
 
Flood Resilience Community pathfinder programme, Defra, 2013–
2015 
t the time of riting, the FRCP evaluation as still underay and it as not possible to assess the 
outcomes of the pathfinder projects for this report. Therefore, this section outlines, as far as possible, key 
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messages from the interim stage of the scheme as a hole and makes specific reference to the Liverpool 
pathfinder case study developed as part of this evidence revie. 
 
Defra commissioned 13 pathfinder projects in 2013, aiming to understand hat factors build the 
resilience of communities to flood risk at the local level, and to assess the benefits of alternative 
partnership models and approaches. The requirements for bidders ere focused on areas at risk of 
flooding, and people ho might be more vulnerable:  
 
e are looking to bidders to use information about local demographics, and local 
knoledge of the community context, to identify social groups or individuals that may be 
more vulnerable and that ould benefit the most from engagement and support.  
Defra, 2012b 
 
Of the 13 pathfinders, six are carrying out actions to benefit people at flood risk in deprived areas. There 
has not been any focus on other groups vulnerable to direct and indirect flood consequences, e.g. older 
people or people ith prior health issues. 
 
The pathfinder projects are all led and initiated by LLFs, but they ere all orking in partnership ith 
other public sector agencies (e.g. the Environment gency (E) is a key stakeholder, ith an active role in 
most of the projects’ steering groups), private companies (e.g. utilities companies), civil society 
organisations (e.g. Groundork), and community members and groups. Nine pathfinders are orking in 
partnership ith the National Flood Forum (NFF), a national charity dedicated to supporting and 
representing communities and individuals at risk of flooding. This current set of activities at the local level 
is complemented by the structures set up to manage emergency planning, specifically the Regional and 
Local Resilience Forums (LRF), hich ere put in place by the Civil Contingencies ct 2004. Members of 
a LRF represent leading public bodies and make up the senior management group, ho are responsible 
for undertaking preparations for, and response to, emergencies and incidents in the area (Cabinet Office, 
2013). Communities are represented on LRFs indirectly via local authorities. hat this provides is a 
structure through hich community resilience planning by LLFs can feed into ider regional and 
national initiatives.  
 
The pathfinder evaluation has established a frameork for measuring community resilience using the five 
resilience categories presented in Chapter 5: social resilience, economic resilience, institutional resilience, 
infrastructure resilience and community capital. Interim findings shoed all 13 pathfinders had made 
progress in Year 1 on the interventions outlined in their original project plans, many of hich directly 
contribute to resilience building as illustrated in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Example pathfinder activities grouped by resilience category 
 
 
 
n as yet unansered question regarding the outputs from pathfinder projects is hether they can, and 
ill in the long term, connect ith or initiate actions and agendas on other direct or indirect 
consequences of climate change. In the Liverpool and est Sussex pathfinders, the top-don aim of the 
LLF is for some flood groups to operate at the parish level, as sub-groups of ider community 
resilience groups. Hoever, community resilience tends to focus on emergency planning for other events 
and is not framed as climate change. 
 
In focus: community action to support the transition to 
a lo-carbon economy and society 
This section incorporates findings from the evidence base on community action about hat community 
energy generation and efficiency, the Transition movement and, to a lesser extent, community food 
groing offer in terms of building capacities for a transition to a lo-carbon economy and society. 
 
The Transition movement: a brief introduction 
The Transition movement’s main aim is to catalyse lo-carbon community action to relocalise economies 
and build resilience to the ‘tin threats’ of peak oil and climate change, through the formation of local 
groups, called Transition Initiatives. The underlying assumption is that a future ith less oil, and less 
energy generally, is inevitable but also preferable, both in terms of mitigating climate change and in terms 
of improved ell-being, and that e therefore need to plan and implement this energy descent to a 
positive, poered-don future. Transition strategy is not simply about prefiguring the future, but 
reconfiguring the present: its systems, lifestyles and livelihoods, and therefore employs a transformative, 
proactive approach toards building community resilience through a transition toards a lo-carbon 
society.  
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lthough a number of climate change or lo-carbon community netorks and organisations, such as the 
Lo Carbon Communities Netork and Greening Communities, link existing groups and/or facilitate the 
creation of ne ones, Transition remains the only self-proclaimed ‘movement’ (Coke, 2013). ithin the 
UK, Transition groups undertake a variety of activities, often focused on the ‘themes’ of food, energy, 
transport, local economy or education. This may range from events such as sustainable energy fairs, local 
food festivals or alking buses, to setting up a community social enterprise, such as a community-
supported agriculture scheme, energy service company or car-share project. The movement is presented 
as apolitical in terms of party political alignments, but there are some activists ho ish to challenge 
existing poer structures more radically, as the Transition Heathro case shos. 
 
Community action related to food groing 
Transition: food-related action 
dopting the categorisation used by Coke (2013), Table 6 presents five sets of activities categorised by 
change strategies and the related resilience categories that are being addressed by the various Transition 
Initiatives. 
 
Table 6: Transition community food activities and resilience (adapted from Coke, 
2013) 
 
 
 
 
These activities continue to evolve, but are addressing all five categories of resilience. 
 
Specific examples by change strategy: 
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• Increasing relevant knoledge and skills: Transition Netork’s course on ‘Resilient Food Systems’ 
offered the opportunity to learn about local food systems and the future challenges in food 
production (Transition Netork, 2013).  
• Encouraging sourcing and eating of local food: Transition North Cornall established the Cornish 
Diet, hich set participants a challenge: ‘to source 85% of their food from Cornall, as ell as 
encouraging local shops and restaurants respectively to stock or use local produce’ (Coke, 2013). 
• Enabling a local lo-carbon food system: The Future of Food, a Transition programme in Essex, 
has helped primary school children to explore here food comes from and promoted consumption 
of local food. ctivities included apple juice pressing and school participation in the Campaign to 
Protect Rural England Food eb Mapping (Transition Netork, 2014b). 
 
Other community action related to food groing 
Evidence on community action related to food groing shos many initiatives have multiple objectives. 
Food groing actions often contribute to more than one strategic category and resilience capacity. For 
example, an ‘eating local’ challenge, such as the Cornish Diet, encourages the sourcing and eating of local 
food, but could also stimulate the supply and provision of local food in outlets, and consequently 
‘potentially helps to provide an enabling environment for a local lo carbon food system, by creating a 
source of local food’ (Coke, 2013). This helps to build social, institutional and economic resilience to 
climate change.  
 
Building social resilience is a core aim of many food groing actions. The Local Food funding programme, 
developed by a consortium of 17 national environmental organisations, distributes funding from the Big 
Lottery Fund (BLF) to food-related projects, to help make locally-gron food more accessible and 
affordable to communities, and has supported more than 500 projects (Kiran et al., 2011). These 
include enterprises such as box schemes, farmers’ markets and food co-operatives; community food 
groing, such as community gardens, composting and community land management; and education and 
learning, including celebrating food cultures, sharing good practice and school grounds. The scheme-level 
evaluation found Local Food projects to be ‘a vehicle for a number of social benefits, including 
community cohesion, regeneration, healthy eating, educational enhancement, integrating disadvantaged 
groups into mainstream society, and developing people’s skills so that they are better able to get into paid 
employment’ (Kiran et al., 2011). hile delivering their overall aim and building social resilience and 
community capital, Local Food projects are also helping to build infrastructure, institutional and economic 
resilience.  
 
Beteen 2007 and 2012, the Plunkett Foundation’s Making Local Food ork programme (Plunkett 
Foundation, 2012) supported over 1,600 local food projects and enterprises to become more 
sustainable, and offers an example of social resilience as a core driver of community action on food 
groing. In their exploration of the diversity of communal groing activities in the UK, hite and Stirling 
(2013) state that hile ‘attending carefully to the definition of this otherise slippery concept, a 
particular focus is given to ho contrasting aspects of temporality and agency lead to divergent 
constructions of ‘resilience’’ and the nature of resilience being built is proactive, as it is intrinsically about 
‘niche protection.8 Hoever, this evidence revie suggests that the action of groing food in the context 
of climate change could be vieed as primarily reactive: projects are commonly ‘reacting’ to potential 
food insecurity caused by climate change consequences elsehere, but they may not be resilient to the 
direct shocks of climate change in their local areas (e.g. floods and heataves) or stresses (e.g. invasive 
species). The extent to hich this is being considered by community food groing actions is unclear from 
the evidence base. 
 
Community action on energy generation and efficiency 
Transition: energy-related activities 
The evidence revie identified feer examples of community energy initiatives than those related to 
community food groing under the Transition movement banner, and they are less embedded.  
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The aims of such initiatives are to reduce energy consumption and generate reneable energy in the 
home. Hoever, a number of better-established Transition Initiatives are also beginning to create some 
of the soft and hard infrastructure that localised energy systems are also likely to require, particularly 
through setting up local energy service companies. For example, Transition Lees as one of the first 
groups to set up a community energy company (Ouse Valley Energy Services Company – OVESCo), an 
Industrial and Provident Society that has been set up so that the community can invest in reneable 
poer generation projects. OVESCo had a contract ith Lees District Council to help lo-income 
households install solar thermal panels, ood-burning stoves, biomass boilers and PV panels. Transition 
Lees has also held a successful annual open eco-house event, demonstrating ho to retrofit homes 
ith climate change adaptation technologies, and has set up a social enterprise ith Transition Brixton to 
promote draughtproofing, etc.  
 
Table 7 provides a useful overvie of the range of practices relating to community energy generation 
and efficiency that Transition groups in the UK are promoting, categorised by change strategy and the 
related resilience capacities being addressed. 
 
Table 7: Transition community energy activities and resilience (adapted from Coke, 
2013)  
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Energy practice outside Transition 
DECC’s 2014 evidence revie, Community energy in the UK: Part 2 final report, states that it is not 
possible to quantify the number of community groups that are currently active in the sector, but 
suggests: 
 
• activity is particularly prevalent in Scotland and South est England; 
• although the majority of groups are based in urban areas, the prevalence of activity in rural areas is 
greater than ould be expected, given the relative number of people living in rural as compared to 
urban areas; and 
• the number of community groups in areas of high deprivation is similar to the number in areas of lo 
deprivation, although there is some variation in the types of project being undertaken. The number 
of community groups solely undertaking projects to raise aareness of opportunities to improve 
energy efficiency appears to be higher in deprived areas than in areas of lo deprivation (DECC, 
2014). 
 
Figure 6 provides a useful, if over-simplified, graphic overvie of the primary data sources and the 
number of community energy generation and efficiency projects, their funding streams, governance and 
the significant overlaps beteen strategies as identified in the evidence revie for DECC (2014). It is 
clear that a community may contribute to more than one strategy and/or have more than one funding 
stream, for example, of the 203 community initiatives funded by the Scottish Climate ction Fund, 32 
are also part of the Sustainable Community Energy Netork (SCENE), and 18 are involved as Energy 
Saving Trust Green Communities. For a specific example, Transition Horncastle is part of the Transition 
Netork and the group’s Green Mothers and Toddlers Group as one of 11 community groups that on 
funding for energy measures from the British Gas Green Streets programme. Therefore, the 
sustainability of a community practice and potential to effect long-term social change could be increased 
by participating in and linking multiple netorks and funding streams. 
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Figure 6: Primary data sources used in the DECC (2014) study, and a simplified 
illustration of the number of community groups identified and significant overlaps 
 
 
 
Note: The diagram accounts for approximately 95% of records included in the master database (N=4,706) 
 detailed examination of 21 projects funded by the Scottish Climate Challenge Fund (CCF) found that 
the majority had provided services or support for short-term behaviour change, ith only a fe, ‘... 
seeking to get local people fully involved in transformative programmes of collective action on climate 
change’ (Brook Lyndhurst and Ecometrica, 2011). The CCF as set up to help communities address 
climate change by reducing their carbon emissions. Beteen 2008 and 2011, 261 communities across 
Scotland received funding to carry out 331 projects. Projects ere funded to encourage people to adopt 
ne lo-carbon behaviours in a number of areas: energy, food groing and purchasing, transport and 
aste.  
 
The projects’ outputs indicated positive outcomes for the building of proactive resilience for all five 
resilience categories: social (e.g. health and ell-being), community (e.g. community cohesion), economic 
(e.g. carbon savings, benefits to local economies), infrastructure (e.g. generation of reneable energy 
systems, insulation) and institutional (e.g. developing relationships ith existing netorks, such as local 
education systems). The evaluators concluded that the projects ere successful in accelerating change, 
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opening up ne possibilities for action that people might not have considered, and helping participants to 
overcome barriers to change, but had little impact on individuals not already open to change. 
 
The 14 community projects chosen to take part in the British Gas Green Streets programme 
represented a ide range of backgrounds and communities, including high to lo levels of community 
capacity (i.e. particularly organisational capability and knoledge of the different types of intervention 
available to save and generate energy), and economic and social resilience (i.e. from significant financial 
resources to others from very deprived communities).  
 
Each community project as given technological advice from British Gas and a share of a £2 million fund 
to spend on micro-generation and energy efficiency measures in community buildings and surrounding 
households to save energy, generate energy and engage the ider community. 
 
Only one of the 14 projects made explicit links to climate change in its objectives (Hyde Farm Climate 
ction Netork); three projects’ objectives related to engaging disadvantaged and vulnerable 
communities; and one Transition Ton project had a range of objectives (Horncastle).  
 
The evaluation of DECC’s Lo Carbon Communities Challenge (2012) found that in addition to the 
8,702 lo-carbon measures delivered in the 22 ‘test-bed’ communities, actions ere undertaken related 
to other consequences of climate change, such as allotments (food security) and a rainater-harvesting 
system (drought). Baseline aareness levels on climate change/energy savings ere high in all 
communities involved in the Lo Carbon Communities Challenge: ‘This is reflective of the fact that in 
some areas a substantial amount of activity as already occurring in response to previous initiatives, 
hich the Lo Carbon Communities Challenge may have replaced’ (DECC, 2012). Therefore, it is difficult 
to kno ho much additional impact as made by the projects on the involved communities’ resilience 
capacities and abilities to take action. This highlights the potential for community action to develop and 
make a difference in the context of climate change hen high levels of community capacity exist across 
all aspects of resilience. 
 
Summary 
This section has presented an overvie of the practice landscape ith respect to actions to reduce 
climate change consequences and/or facilitate the transition to a lo-carbon society. Broadly, actions are 
focused on building up the different capacities important for resilience building, ith key synergies 
emerging beteen institutional capacity building (e.g. development of flood action groups) and 
community capital (relationships beteen people).  
 
The direction of travel for flood risk management is from a predominantly reactive focus toards a more 
proactive approach, especially as flood action groups get more established and start developing flood 
action plans and linking into ider strategic flood risk management processes.  
 
The Transition movement vision is very much a proactive transformative one, and core activities such as 
food groing and reneable energy projects place emphasis on that. Hoever, more research is needed 
to understand ho far the Transition movement considers resilience of its activities to climate change 
impacts, e.g. flooding, drought, etc., in its planning for a lo-carbon society.  
 
It seems that community actions relating to food groing tend to have the broadest appeal, and may 
offer the greatest potential for engaging people in community resilience to ider climate change 
consequences, closely folloed by community action on energy. 
 
Overall, the evidence from practice suggests that community capital does appear to be a core capacity 
and other capacities are less likely to be delivered ithout it. More research is needed to understand this 
fully. The next chapter looks in more detail at hich factors support or undermine the development of 
community resilience in the context of climate change. 
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7 Factors that support or 
undermine the development of 
community resilience 
Box 6: Key messages on factors that support or undermine community resilience 
 
• Evidence from practice supports theoretical ideas that developing capacities can build resilience. 
Depending on the type of local action and pre-existing conditions and resources, some may be more 
critical than others: 
Economic resources and/or access to funding are essential to start up and develop community actions. 
Community onership of, or access to, infrastructure and land may prove critical in providing a site for 
the activity to take place, or for local groups to meet and share knoledge and skills. 
Local knoledge and pre-existing capabilities can provide valuable resources and insights. 
Building on community capital to develop institutional capacity can increase ider community resilience. 
 
• Community action that can stimulate resilience to climate change is motivated by a range of factors 
including concerns about climate change itself, but also other motives. 
  
•  ider, social framing can lead to community engagement in actions that support climate 
change resilience: actions that start by dealing ith a community’s daily needs and concerns, and aim 
to increase community ell-being more idely, can be more appealing than a climate change focus. 
This framing may vary depending on the socio-economic characteristics of the community.  
 
• Engagement across the local community cultivates acceptability and onership of responses to 
climate change. 
 
• n ‘outsider’ status can undermine the potential for an organisation to establish an initiative. 
Early local involvement and transparency in planning and decision-making can mitigate against this. 
 
This section looks at the factors that may help or undermine resilience building. Despite the lack of 
documented community actions and limited evaluations undertaken, our revie of community action in 
conjunction ith the case study analysis suggests the folloing factors have a significant impact on the 
development of community resilience to climate change: 
 
• framing of activities and diversity of drivers for community action; 
• community capacities and resources;  
• economic resources and access to funding; and 
• community engagement versus local opposition. 
 
Framing of activities and diversity of drivers for 
community action 
It is essential to understand hat motivates people to engage in community resilience projects and to 
frame activities in a ay that appeals to the community and dras support. Framings ill be related to 
existing community interests and needs, and may therefore vary. 
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 DECC (2014) evidence revie identified the folloing drivers for groups to become involved in 
community energy projects (in order of importance): 
 
• addressing climate change/reducing carbon emissions; 
• reducing energy bills; and 
• community income generation. 
 
Evidence suggests that climate change is often not the primary or only driver for community energy 
projects. The British Gas Green Streets programme evaluation (Platt et al., 2011) found the drivers or 
motivations for community leaders’ participation varied idely, but primarily stemmed from a desire to do 
something of benefit for their community and be part of a local initiative, to do something about climate 
change, or both.  
 
Matthes and Pratt (2012) concur: 
 
… ’climate change’ as a concept may not be the best ay to engage people or to frame local 
activities […] placing climate change action ithin the broader field of improving community 
resilience and sustainability might be more fruitful, especially if this enables actions to be 
more explicitly linked to more everyday concerns, like jobs, skills, food, injustice or ellbeing.  
 
This framing has been argued to be particularly effective in engaging ith people ho live in more 
deprived, urban communities ho are likely to respond to ‘attractions that go beyond climate change 
debates to ‘here and no’ benefits’ (Matthes and Pratt, 2012), hile it also appears to appeal to 
community leaders. Examples can be found in initiatives related to energy, food, and others aiming to 
reduce the need for goods and people to travel long distances, and increase resilience to global economic 
shocks. The latter provides an example of a framing that incorporates some of the indirect consequences 
of climate change, in this case the increase of fuel prices linked to the cost of transport, hich affects 
people in a more obvious ay than climate change, per se. 
 
Community food groing action is often a route into involvement in community action addressing other 
consequences of climate change. Using food as a route to engage people can be much more productive 
in attracting participants outside of ‘the already converted’ (Brook Lyndhurst and Ecometrica, 2011). The 
experience of Transition Heathro has borne out the finding that, ‘food and gardening projects are far 
and aay the most popular practical ays for Transition initiatives to start engaging people in hands-on 
action’ (Haxeltine and Seyfang, 2012). Coke’s (2013) revie of Transition initiatives points out that ‘food 
is usually the first theme to inspire community action in a Transition Initiative’.  
 
The Good Life Initiative (Cinderby et al., 2014) provides insight into potential pathays to community 
engagement, particularly in less affluent areas. They maintain that flexible delivery is required to ensure 
that the activities resonate ith local needs, knoledge and skills. Broadly, community food projects tend 
not to have ‘building community resilience to climate change’ as a central, explicit objective (DECC, 
2014). Instead, this tends be a more informal aim or unintended outcome of making locally gron food 
more accessible, sustainable and affordable for communities.  
 
 number of stimuli can be identified for community food groing actions, including: the recession, 
increasing aareness of food, links ith health and ell-being, increasing publicity given to campaigns for 
ethical food production, Slo Food and organic movements, limited allotment availability, and increasingly 
busy lives. Significant amounts of grant funding having been made available from the BLF (of hich 
Making Local Food ork as one funding stream). 
 
The success of this framing can be partly attributed to the perceived benefits of community food 
groing, hich extend beyond food, resilience and climate change: 
 
hile the main activity in the UK is groing food, much else is gron in the process – 
including community, confidence, elfare and skills[…][G]roing is recognised to have the 
potential for therapeutic benefits for those involved[…]). It can also enable people to access 
fresh, healthy produce relatively cheaply here they have more time but less money.  
hite and Stirling, 2013  
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Learning to ork collectively has also been found to help individuals develop key social skills, as it provides 
opportunities to have fun and be sociable (Matthes and Pratt, 2012). There is also evidence that people 
ill get involved as a means of protesting against perceived threats to their local community or 
neighbourhood. In some cases, this has direct links ith concerns related to climate change. Box 7 
provides an example of a community-led, crod-funded energy scheme, REPOERBalcombe in est 
Sussex, Southern England, here community interest in action as galvanised by the threat of fracking. 
 
Box 7: Learning from REPOERBalcombe 
 
Community generation co-operative REPOERBalcombe as established in 2013 by community 
members of Balcombe, a village in est Sussex. Similarly to Transition Heathro, this community action 
originated out of protest; in Balcombe’s case, it as the threat of fracking explorations in the local area 
by Cuadrilla Resources that galvanised opposition and action.  core aim of REPOERBalcombe is to 
eventually generate the equivalent to 100% of Balcombe’s electricity demand through community-
oned, locally-generated reneable energy. Profits from the scheme ill go back into the village, funding 
more solar installations and energy-saving measures for homes and community buildings; increasing all 
resilience capacities; and furthering the transition to being a lo-carbon community. The campaigning 
organisation 10:10 has been ‘orking ith them on a ay to let people further afield invest in the co-op 
too, helping to finance the project, hile keeping control in local hands… helping to unite the so-called 
‘fracking village’’. The support of 10:10 ill have provided a boost to community capital and institutional 
resilience. 
 
Similarly, Transition Heathro as initiated by activists protesting against airport expansion as part of 
efforts to avoid increased carbon emissions linked to concerns about climate change. The group’s Gro 
Heathro initiative has been focused around developing a derelict space and food groing activities in a 
threatened village, thereby improving local amenities and offering scope for hands-on involvement from 
local people. The agenda is also more directly about saving homes ithin these communities, hich 
connects ith local interests and motivates ider involvement and support. 
 
Ho actions are framed ill hinder or facilitate the engagement of community members. hile there 
may be scope to extend this to emphasise climate change over time, this research shos that a focus on 
activities that perhaps meet a number of needs, from personal through to community, and lead to a 
range of capacities being developed, might be the most fruitful ay forard. It also suggests that threats 
can galvanise community action in a ay that may also build resilience. 
 
Community capacities and resources 
Pre-existing capacity, local knoledge and capabilities 
One of the main characteristics of resilient systems is the presence of local and traditional knoledge and 
pre-existing capabilities.  
 
These ere identified by the British Gas Green Streets evaluation as enabling factors: ‘Pre-existing skills 
and circumstances in some communities – such as the professional background and financial security of 
group leaders and members – made a clear if not decisive impact on the outcomes of the project’ (Platt 
et al., 2011). In the Norton community ind energy case study (see Chapter 4), the main director (though 
not a local resident) noted that he had been taking the project forard himself, bringing in expertise and 
utilising contacts he had gained from past ork in the ind energy industry.  
 
Volunteers and voluntary groups often provide essential human resources for community projects. 
Volunteering9 has a strong and established history in the UK, ith 41% of adults in 2013–14 
volunteering formally at least once a year (Cabinet Office, 2014).  study on volunteers involved in flood 
and coastal risk management in England highlighted the importance of mobilising volunteers through 
provision of guidance, processes and tools, and recognition of the importance of local knoledge (Forest 
Research, 2015). 
 
The value of pre-existing community capacities and knoledge cannot be underestimated, especially in 
the current political climate, leading to a greater reliance on community members to initiate and lead 
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actions. This has implications for the extent to hich actions focus on those ho are most climate 
disadvantaged. Jonsson and Lundgren (2014), hile researching community approaches to heat stress in 
Seden, found considerable local knoledge about vulnerability drivers and the inter-relations beteen 
social factors and vulnerability. That suggests that this type of ‘contextualised knoledge’ is valuable in 
developing adaptive responses that take account of local vulnerabilities and avoid increasing inequalities. 
See Chapter 9 on resilience and vulnerability for further discussion. 
 
Even in cases here capabilities exist in a community, it can be difficult for small organisations or 
volunteers to mobilise the time, expertise and resources required to see a project successfully through 
planning (alker, 2008). In the Norton case study, both directors of the community-interest energy 
company had full-time jobs outside of the project and had to commit significant amounts of their free 
time. Similarly, much of the FRCP ork has been made possible by residents incorporating tasks such as 
monitoring river levels into their daily lives. 
 
Lack of time as a resource or lack of commitment can hinder the development of an initiative, and its 
importance should not be underestimated. This also matters in making the time for ne netorking 
activities (as belo). 
 
Community capital and institutional capacity 
The Liverpool pathfinder case study highlights the importance of strengthening institutional resilience 
(i.e. the capacity of institutions to ork effectively together and ith local organisations) as an element of 
overall community resilience. This creates links from the community to ider resilience netorks, across 
local, city-ide and national agencies and organisations (including the E, ater companies, neighbouring 
local authorities, ard members, local MPs, the NFF, police, Defra, voluntary organisations and private 
companies). 
 
In the case of community flood resilience, there is considerable overlap beteen institutional resilience 
(hich focuses on organisations and netorks specifically orking on flooding) and ider community 
capacity not directly concerned ith the management of flood risk. Community capital includes 
community groups, netorks, local knoledge, flood experience, etc. 
 
In the Liverpool case study, a small group of volunteer flood ardens monitors ater levels in the river, 
arns neighbours about flood risk, and provides information about blockages and problems in the river to 
the relevant management authorities. One intervieee highlighted that hile property-level protection 
(PLP) measures have been a key focus of the project, the aareness they create in the community is the 
most important gain in terms of resilience: 
 
“[Property level protection] hasn’t got longevity in the sense that after a certain amount of 
time it deteriorates. That’s the ay of the orld. But the bigger message for me, really, is 
this aareness thing, and getting people aare of hat flooding … hat the flooding risks 
are and ho they can prepare themselves for it. nd it’s the mantra ithin our emergency 
planning, really, in terms of be aare and then prepare.”  
Intervieee 3, Liverpool pathfinder case study 
 
This reflects the importance of linking community infrastructure (e.g. PLP) to increased community 
capacities.  
 
Building on pre-existing community capital, the Liverpool pathfinder has supported the setting-up of a 
flood group by engaging community members in activities through the oodlands Estate Residents’ 
ssociation. One intervieee reported that community engagement, aareness raising, and the 
development of innovative tools and activities are helping to foster community onership, trust and 
sustainable practices: 
 
 “Community capital is the key to sustainability. The role of the residents' association has 
been critical in the success of the pathfinder so far. PLP is the hook that is being used to 
open the door of engagement ith local residents so that they can be aare of the risks and 
make preparations.”  
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For the Liverpool pathfinder, the creation of a community flood group as the next step in developing 
institutional resilience. The flood group has dran up an action plan of the local flooding concerns to 
discuss ith various agencies. There has been an emphasis on building links to emergency planning and 
flood risk management institutions. There have been several multi-agency meetings attended by the 
council, the E, United Utilities (the local ater company) and the residents’ flood group. These meetings 
provide an opportunity for residents to raise issues of concern about flood risk management and to find 
out about the ork that the agencies are doing, as ell as improving cross-agency orking and sharing 
of learning. For example, these agencies recently gave a joint presentation to a major conference in the 
city on ho to put together an effective flood plan. The project has enabled local residents to ork on 
initiatives ith multiple objectives, going beyond increasing physical resistance to flooding to encompass 
measures that increase the physical attractiveness of the area and the ell-being of its residents, such as 
the planting of trees in collaboration ith Mersey Forest. There is great potential offered by these 
activities to enhance flood risk management and preparedness in ays that quantifiably improve the 
community’s overall resilience, and to deliver sustained improvements that have the potential to be 
applied in other areas. 
 
nother example of building on pre-existing structures is Sustain Eden, a ne partnership built on the 
Cumbria ction for Sustainability, a three-year project funded by the BLF’s Communities Living 
Sustainably (CLS) programme in response to floods in Cockermouth in 2009. The project sought to 
address flood risk issues through effective planning and investigate potential sustainable transport models 
ith a focus on building community resilience to climate change. Folloing on from, and building on, this 
project, Sustain Eden is also no funded by CLS. Sustain Eden, to date, has supported four voluntary 
organisations in developing emergency plans; almost 700 people have attended flood aareness-raising 
sessions; 650 people have attended events here they have shared their on expertise, stories, skills and 
knoledge; and they have delivered flood defence training. 
 
Economic resources and access to funding 
Securing funding can be crucial for successfully planning and developing a project, especially for small 
organisations or volunteers (alker, 2008). Lack of economic resources can hinder a project’s 
development and progress. For example, folloing a to-year period hen the Norton project had been 
sustained by the personal contributions of the community-interest energy company’s project leaders, 
they encountered difficulties in raising money. The main director recalled that at times it had been 
difficult to access funds, in part because of the complexity of the forms and the criteria that had to be 
met: ‘There are certainly funds there but administratively it’s quite hard to get all the boxes ticked.’ s 
one of the directors noted, this as partly because of the stage that the project as at; hile funding as 
available through the Rural Community Energy Fund, this as largely to conduct initial feasibility studies, 
and develop a business plan and planning application. It as also relatively easy to find funding to 
complete the construction of projects once they had been granted planning permission. But funding for 
projects that are beteen these to stages appears to be more challenging: 
 
“There’s been no state funding for years no, and really hat’s kept the project alive is the 
fact that I’ve [personally been part of] a joint venture ith an organisation, and they’ve been 
happy to pay the odd £1,000 here and there, just to do small reports and things like that, 
that the planners have asked for.” 
Community-interest energy company director 1 
 
ccess to upfront capital is essential to enable community groups to meet the costs associated ith 
obtaining planning permission for reneable energy schemes, to conduct feasibility studies for 
technologies, or even to become properly constituted (Platt et al., 2011). In addition, policy on feed-in 
tariffs and other energy funding streams may have longer-term implications for the financial viability or 
business models of community reneable schemes. Funding for other projects in the areas of flooding 
and food has come through central government and charitable trusts. Many of Defra’s FRCP projects 
have used part of the funding to employ dedicated community engagement staff to facilitate the 
development of community flood groups. For example, this has enabled the est Sussex pathfinder to 
support community groups to access further funding from the county council to help ith running costs. 
Having responsibility for these funds formalises each group and ensures that they can cover expenses. 
Cynefin’s funding has come from the elsh Government and supports Place Coordinators to be 
catalysts for developing community actions around improving the local area. Finally, Transition Heathro 
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received start-up funding from the Polden-Puckham Charitable Foundation, and a number of charitable 
bodies support the Transition movement more idely.10 In summary, actions to build community 
resilience require some level of funding to enable them to progress. 
 
Infrastructure and access to land 
Other resources that may prove critical include access to land and community onership of assets such 
as buildings and equipment. Community assets can be utilised in multiple ays depending on the needs 
and specific objectives of the community action. Groups generally need somehere to meet and more 
may need office space to coordinate action; space may also be needed to store equipment by a food 
groing initiative, or to act as a local ‘resilience hub’ here equipment for use in the case of flooding can 
be stored. Further, it could also act as an evacuation space in a flooding emergency. 
 
hile such assets can facilitate the development and operations of an initiative, JRF’s revie of evidence 
(Dobson, 2011) folloing a series of seminars on community assets, arns these assets can become a 
liability and “communities need time and support to develop their plans”. The key message emerging for 
community organisations is that they ought to be ‘self-aare, prepared, sufficiently skilled to manage 
projects and buildings, sure of local support, and ready for a long-term commitment’.  
 
Squatting a privately-oned site, Gro Heathro has been under threat of eviction since ugust 2014 
but continues to thrive ith support from the local residents, the Member of Parliament (John 
McDonnell MP), Hillingdon Borough Council and the Metropolitan Police. Formerly derelict, the land has 
been transformed from a site of anti-social behaviour to a ell-regarded community hub, organic garden 
and an example of ho to communities can adapt to lo-carbon, sustainable, off-grid living. It provides a 
venue for local residents and environmental activists to share knoledge and practical skills, and for other 
groups to meet. Further land has also been reclaimed for food groing.  
 
This example further demonstrates the ider community benefits arising from the utilisation of a 
previously deserted space. The JRF (Dobson, 2011) identified these benefits and concluded these should 
be factored into officials’ decision-making in cases of community/public onership: ‘Key messages for 
government include the importance of timely and adequate support, the need to value public benefits 
hen negotiating sales, and the need to consider the ider costs of letting assets lie neglected.’  
 
Depending on the nature of the project/initiative, some elements and types of capacity and resource may 
be more crucial than others. For instance, hile human resources and local knoledge are undoubtedly a 
vital success factor for most projects, in the case of community food groing initiatives (such as Gro 
Heathro), access to land as the critical factor. 
 
Capitalising on pre-existing community capital (e.g. netorks, resources), institutional resilience (e.g. 
community groups already in place), infrastructure resilience (e.g. flood defences and arning systems), 
social resilience (e.g. individual knoledge) and economic resilience (e.g. investments in community assets) 
ill help to build community resilience. It is therefore important to understand the starting point and the 
resilience capacities that are already in a community, in order to build on existing assets and develop 
momentum. 
 
Community engagement versus local opposition 
The importance of mobilising local resources has been discussed earlier, ith reference to the skills and 
knoledge that are available and can be put toards building local community resilience. Nonetheless, 
engaging the local community also has benefits in terms of social coherence, equity, acceptability and 
onership of responses to climate change.  
 
For instance, Bahadur et al. (2010) identify a positive link beteen community engagement and a more 
equal access to natural resources and resilience. Ebi and Semenza (2008), in a study of the health 
consequences of climate change in various contexts, further argue that ‘engaging communities in the 
broader process of adaptation ill enhance their resilience to climate stressors and ill likely increase 
their ability to cope ith other societal issues’. Their study advocates community-based adaptation here 
engagement is an integral part of the design, implementation and monitoring of any intervention. They 
suggest that ‘the theoretic underpinning of community-based adaptation lies in the concept of social 
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capital, hich is the potential embedded in social relationships that enables… community action to 
achieve shared goals’.  
 
Gro Heathro demonstrates ho ide community engagement is achieved in practice, and orks to 
support the development and establishment of a successful community initiative. It provides an example 
of a grassroots movement that has successfully engaged local members of the public, the local council, 
local politicians and local police authorities, by integrating different concerns over the expansion of the 
airport and its potential impacts into a single action plan. Community engagement has been integral to 
each step in the creation and development of Gro Heathro. t the start of the project, the activists 
consulted ith the local community at a residents’ meeting to check that there ere no objections to the 
proposed squatting of the land. ith the help of local residents, they cleared rubbish from the site, 
repaired greenhouses and turned them into living, orkshop and groing spaces, and reclaimed land for 
further planting: 
 
“…They’ve utilised a piece of land that as being, frankly, abused by the land oner. There 
as massive amount of fly tip rubbish: car parts, car braking, fuel tanks; all manner of things 
on this agricultural land. hat they’ve done is be a completely open community space. 
nyone can ring that bell at the entrance and they’ll open the doors and let you in. s a 
result it’s become a hub and it’s the only community space e’ve got. I’m gobsmacked they 
could be forcibly removed hen they’re doing so much good for our community here.”11 
Christine, local resident intervieed for a video on Gro Heathro 
 
Building local capacities to cope ith future climate change consequences has stimulated debates about 
the kind of communities and society local people ould like to live in, the rights and legalities of squatting 
on privately oned land, and the politics of climate change. There is an adaptation component, in that 
one of the aims of the project is to promote community resilience, by developing community and 
resource autonomy. Community is seen as a bottom-up, undifferentiated locus of democratic decision-
making, in opposition to corporate and government elites. In this framing, community resilience to 
climate change means autonomous local communities that are able to resist the poer of carbon-
promoting elites and to facilitate a lo-carbon future, based on a particular vision of sustainable living: 
off-grid, food-groing communities, rooted in radical values. It thus requires a social and institutional 
transformation in both ays of living and processes of decision-making, though the specific resilience is 
not about adapting to change in the local context, but resisting it.  
 
Beyond the recognition of the importance of engaging the local community, it is also important to 
understand that different kinds of approach may be needed to get through to residents and build 
onership, depending on the characteristics of the community and existing links and netorks 
(community capital). Initiatives that have developed such an understanding and adopted the appropriate 
approach are more likely to be successful in their engagement. The Liverpool case study offers an 
example: linking back to the importance of local knoledge, Liverpool City Council (LCC) staff ere, as 
one intervieee put it, ‘light on their feet’ in reducing the eight of bureaucratic processes to facilitate 
community participation and make the most of residents’ understanding of local conditions. One example 
as that local residents distributed official LCC letters about the project, in the process explaining their 
relevance to older people or those ith disabilities, single parent families and others ho might normally 
not even look at a formal communication of this kind.  
 
Developing links ith organisations outside of the local areas (Groundork UK, 2013; hite and Stirling, 
2013; Mguni, 2011) is also vieed as an important factor for successful community initiatives:  
 
The most successful leaders also realise the importance of relationships ith other 
stakeholders, ith other outside organisations, ith the council and other statutory 
providers. They can channel the voice of the community members to those ho are in a 
position to make change happen.  
Young Foundation, 2012 
 
In contrast, lack of or inadequate public engagement and community consultation can lead to 
dissatisfaction and disapproval. Often there is an assumption that nominally ‘community-led’ projects ill 
generate greater local support and avoid the opposition that is common to private developer projects 
(alker, 2008). The Norton community reneable energy project, for example, led by a social enterprise 
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and ith social motives, still faced significant local opposition as it as not community-led. There ere 
several reasons for this opposition, but concerns centred on justice and fairness ere often at the 
forefront. In terms of procedural justice, opposition groups complained strongly that there had been a 
lack of involvement for local people in the design and implementation of the project prior to its 
submission for planning permission (Simcock, 2012). Once the planning application had been submitted, 
this concern as raised in several formal objections to the planning authority. lthough the community-
interest energy company had run a community-ide poll that enabled local residents to vote on hether 
they anted the project to go ahead, objectors complained that involvement in this one decision as 
insufficient – they also anted greater, more transparent community involvement and influence in other 
key decisions, such as the siting and number of turbines, and even the choice of technology itself (Ibid.). 
They also argued that there as a need for better quality information – ithout this, the community poll 
ould be essentially meaningless, and people ould be unable to make an informed decision: 
 
“These are questions that ought to be ansered. I don’t think e can say if e support it 
until e kno more.”  
Local resident, male 
 
“[The information] as just very condensed and just basically told you enough to dra you 
in.” 
Local resident, female 
 
In addition, community concerns ere heightened by the fact that the community-interest energy 
company as an ‘outsider’ to the area, hich contributed to a lack of trust. 
 
Insiders/outsiders 
The case studies demonstrate that undertaking community activities can be even more challenging for an 
organisation that ould be considered an outsider by the local community.  
 
The Norton case suggests that it can be difficult even for ell-intentioned social enterprises to simply 
drop in to a local area and expect to be able to build community energy projects and resilient, lo-carbon 
communities. The project as initiated and led by an outsider to the local area, the community-interest 
energy company. Despite the company being a not-for-profit organisation led by committed experts in 
the reneable energy industry, their outsider status contributed to a lack of trust in their motives from 
local residents. 
 
Residents felt they had not been involved enough in key decisions during pre-planning stages. In other 
cases of energy projects led from ithin the local community, by already-trusted local residents, the 
same degree of involvement and information is not alays necessary, since residents are prepared to 
trust that the project leaders ill do the right thing for the area (Simcock, 2012). Hoever, in the Norton 
case, information and transparency relating to all of the community-interest energy company’s actions 
ere considered vital for ensuring the community’s interests ere protected.  
 
Initiatives need to be embedded ithin the local area, alloing a strong and transparent role for local 
people in influencing key decisions; in the case of reneable energy projects, this includes the choice of 
technology, its scale and location. 
 
Transition Heathro highlights the political nature of community action for building resilience to climate 
change. hile it as set up by people ho came from outside the community ith a particular vision of 
the orld they ant to achieve, they moved into a ard here many people ere already opposed to the 
expansion of Heathro irport, though not necessarily for the same reason. hile the activist group that 
set up the initiative is campaigning against the expansion of Heathro irport and its consequences for 
climate change, the local council is concerned ith local consequences but is not opposed to airport 
expansion per se. This has enabled alliances to be built ith individuals and organisations that ant the 
same outcome (the prevention of the local consequences of the airport expansion), even if the 
underlying rationale is different.  
 
hile it appears that decisions on Gro Heathro’s overall direction, as ell as day-to-day organisation, 
are taken by those actively involved in Transition Heathro, activists did consult the community about 
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their plans to squat the site, and they ere accompanied by local residents hen they moved in. One 
intervieee feels this helped to ‘embed the project in the local area, a sort of sense of legitimacy in the 
area’. He believed they had gone from being regarded to some extent as ‘outsiders’ to ‘local residents’ as 
they developed friendships in the community, as endorsed by local resident, lan Boyd: 
 
“Some of the locals, most of the locals probably, ere probably a bit suspicious about hippy 
types coming in and squatting, but ithin eeks they really became a valued part of the 
community and everyone as going around saying, “ren’t these people lovely? ren’t the 
police being horrible to them?” They really got embedded in the community quickly and 
they supported us ith our campaign against the runay and it’s just gron from there. 
They’re a really central part of the community no; everybody loves them!”12 
 
s a community ithin a community, they have also managed a sustained presence for five years, hich 
has perhaps helped them to become seen as part of the ider community, although the transience of 
residents in Gro Heathro and in the Heathro Villages ard has made maintaining relationships 
challenging. It also highlights the issue of nurturing the personal resilience of the organisers of such 
community action, an aspect that the Transition Netork has picked up on generally in the ork of 
Transition initiatives, and hich they attempt to provide support ith. Gro Heathro itself appears to 
have become a space for other activist groups to plan, share and possibly recharge. 
Looking at the challenges faced by an ‘outsider’, these may not differ significantly from those that an 
‘insider’ or local organisation/group might face (e.g. requests for information and transparency), though 
they are likely more onerous to deal ith, due to the increased level of uncertainty introduced by the lack 
of familiarity. hile establishing trust may be more demanding for an outsider, the Heathro case study 
demonstrates that if timely, appropriate and adequate engagement ith locals happens, an outsider can 
eventually be regarded as an insider. hat is more, an outsider can bring in crucial knoledge, 
experience, expertise, energy and commitment, mobilising and pulling together local resources to 
develop resilience. 
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8 Governance and the roles of 
different stakeholders in 
developing community resilience 
Box 8: Key messages on governance and the roles of different stakeholders in developing 
community resilience 
 
• There is no clear indication of hether the type of governance structure enables or hinders the 
development of community resilience, but a flexible approach that connects ith local realities is 
linked to ider approaches to climate change, facilitates learning and enhances community 
cohesion. 
 
•  combined community-led and institutional-led approach is essential to developing effective 
community resilience in the long term and helping to ensure that all areas that are climate vulnerable 
receive support.  
 
•  shared agenda and close relationship beteen stakeholders tend to support the development of 
a successful partnership and/or initiative. 
 
•  key role for national government is in sending a signal of intent, setting an enabling policy 
frameork and funding activity. 
 
• In the UK the removal of the statutory requirement for local authorities to address climate change, 
and a lack of capacity and funding, appear to be making it more difficult for local government to 
assume the leadership role seen in other countries.  
 
• Civil society organisations (e.g. NGOs, voluntary and community groups) are often an important 
broker beteen communities and institutions. 
 
One area of capacities Cutter et al. (2010) consider important in building resilience are institutional 
arrangements, groups and actions set up to facilitate citizen engagement both in orking ith and 
challenging existing structures, in order to address consequences of climate change. Bahadur et al. 
(2010) further suggest a high level of diversity of participating stakeholders is also fundamental, as each 
of them performs a different function in building resilience. The stakeholders emerging from the 
literature and practice revie of climate change community initiatives include the folloing: 
 
• central government; 
• local government; 
• government agencies and other public bodies; 
• NGOs and charitable organisations/institutions; 
• community groups/organisations; 
• members of the public (citizens); and 
• private companies. 
In this revie there has been a focus on actions that happen in partnership beteen citizens and other 
institutions/organisations, in order to consider the links beteen the formal and informal processes and 
structures concerned ith building community resilience. They may have central or local government 
funding and be more or less netorked into ider institutions of governance. 
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Stakeholders’ capacities and strengths 
Evidence on governance for resilience/adaptation to climate change stresses the importance of links 
beteen community groups, local councils and national governments, in order for measures to be 
effective: ‘the types of adaptation measures implemented primarily from the top don may not promote 
resilience in the long term; likeise those measures implemented from the bottom up require some level 
of collaboration from the top to maximise their effectiveness’ (maru and Chhetri, 2013). This echoes 
Ebi and Semenza (2008) and Ingold et al. (2010), ho also concluded that there is the need for both 
grassroots action and top-don interventions. Castan Broto and Bulkeley (2013) found evidence of the 
rise of non-state actors in leading interventions or experiments, as ell as the importance of 
partnerships.  
 
 key theme emerging is that interventions by partnerships are more successful as they combine the 
positive elements of individual actors and eliminate the eaknesses of single organisations (Castan Broto 
and Bulkeley, 2012; Ebi and Semenza, 2008; Ennis, 2013; Feola and Nunes, 2014). Informal 
organisations and NGOs often have knoledge and relationships ith the community that could ‘extend 
the operation of the state’ (Castan Broto and Bulkeley, 2012) and help build consensus. Ennis (2013), 
described the ‘ideal characteristics of a ne governance model’ for Transition initiatives, ith reference 
to a ‘Transition Council that is participatory at all levels and open to community-led ventures’. In such a 
Transition Council ‘ideas and efforts ould come from [a] local community, assistance in planning, 
organisation and funding ould come from [a] council and ould enable community groups such as 
Transition Tons to develop bottom-up responsibility’ (Hopkins, 2008). 
 
Evidence suggests that community actions in addressing any consequence of climate change and in any 
locality benefit from building on pre-existing partnerships or linkages, such as ith local government, 
national agencies, emergency services or other voluntary and community groups (CLS Climate Change 
Netork, 2014; Cinderby et al., 2014; DECC, 2012; ilding, 2011). This as a deliberate focus of 
DECC’s Lo Carbon Communities Challenge and as identified as a key to the success of Sustain Eden in 
Cumbria, hich builds on previous flood ork ith the BLF to link local authority flood emergency 
response plans to community resilience activities, and requires ork ith statutory agencies to develop a 
joined-up community plan:  
 
s a result of the project activities, partnerships have been built beteen community 
groups, local councils, emergency services and organisations such as the Environment 
gency…. The community projects have built their profile and contacts over the past year 
and are no more engaged ith decision makers in the area. This is enabling some projects 
to attempt to influence these local climate change adaptation approaches.  
CLS Climate Change Netork, 2014  
 
ithout top-don intervention, there can be a danger of a groing gap beteen those areas ith pre-
existing community capacity and good partnership orking, and those areas ithout those capacities, 
leading to different levels of local resilience to the consequences of climate change. 
 
The relationship beteen stakeholders 
The closeness of the relationship beteen individual actors and the existence of a shared agenda can 
have an impact on the success of an initiative. In the UK, hile some local authorities have adopted 
motions in support of Transition, this does not appear to have led to any more formal relationships (Coke, 
2014). Hoever, Transition groups do develop links ith their local councils, and Feola and Nunes (2014) 
concluded that those Transition groups that have formed closer links ith their councils have probably 
tended to be more successful. Coke (2013) further found that the closeness of the relationship 
depended on ho radically challenging the Transition initiative as to the council’s agenda, together ith 
the personal relationships developed ith council officers.  
 
For instance, the approach taken by Transition Heathro to build community resilience has largely 
focused on strengthening social and cultural capital. This is done by providing a supportive space here 
local residents can come and discuss plans for community action, and running orkshops to help 
participants develop practical skills to resist airport expansion, or to live in ays that are seen as more 
sustainable. By building relationships ith local poer holders, in particular ith the local Member of 
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Parliament (John McDonnell MP), engaging ith the local council and Neighbourhood Plan as part of the 
Heathro Villages Planning Committee, and highlighting the plight of the Heathro Villages and 
themselves in the national media, they have been able to use this political capital to survive.  
 
hile members of the local community have used these facilities, it is not clear ho many have taken 
advantage of these opportunities and hat impact they have had. necdotally, it can be seen that some 
local people feel grateful for the presence of Gro Heathro in face of the threat of airport expansion. 
The provision of a space to meet, as ell as to gro vegetables and fruit locally, is also contributing to the 
infrastructure capacity of the community, as described in Cutter et al. (2010). 
 
Partnership and governance modes 
 number of authors have suggested the need for ne governance models. Hartz-Karp and Meister 
(2011) suggest that a more radical redesign of engagement and governance ill be critical in order to 
achieve community resilience. They suggest the need for collaborative governance ‘involving the 
deliberated isdom of ordinary citizens’ and provide an example of an initiative in estern ustralia. In 
the context of coastal erosion in Ne Zealand, Hayard (2008) suggests the need to rethink democratic 
processes: ‘this includes revisiting concepts of scale in decision making (both spatial and temporal), 
procedural justice, and linkage (beteen local, regional, national and international governments, citizens, 
non-governmental organisations and the private sector)’.  
 
Castan Broto and Bulkeley (2013), in their revie of urban climate change experiments13 in more than 
100 cities orldide, described the partnerships, leading actors and modes of governance14 that enabled 
the experiments. Their research revealed the folloing: 
 
• Forty seven per cent of experiments involved some form of formally recognised partnership beteen 
actors at different governance levels, suggesting that an increasing level of co-operation is necessary 
to address climate change.  
• Local governments have a prominent role in leading 66% of urban climate change experiments. The 
most common forms of partnership are those in hich the local government leads ith either private 
actors (112 experiments) or civil society actors (44 experiments). 
 
ccording to Bulkeley and Kern (2006), municipalities can deploy four modes of governance: 
 
• self-governing – changing ho their on operations are managed, in order to ‘lead by example’; 
• provision – greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities; 
• regulations – enforcing ne las, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and  
• enabling – supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and 
partnerships. 
 
The majority of initiatives revieed (41%) fall under the provision category. nother 30% are enabling. s 
might have been expected, partnerships favour enabling initiatives and, interestingly, regulation becomes 
a less likely mode of governance hen a partnership is in place (Table 8). 
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Table 8: Distribution of initiatives in terms of leading actor, partnerships and mode 
of governance (Castan Broto and Bulkeley, 2013) 
 
 
Looking at these findings in conjunction ith findings from UK literature and evidence revies, 
interesting points are emerging. 
 
Governance modes across the cases studies 
The case studies reveal different types of governance structure, though there is no clear indication if any 
of these enable or hinder the development of community resilience to climate change. dopting Bulkeley 
and Kern’s modes of governance categorisation (2006) described above, e could classify the four case 
studies in this revie as enabling, ith the exception of Transition Heathro, hich ould more 
accurately be described as self-governing.  
 
The governance structure of the Llanelli programme in the Cynefin case study, for instance, takes an 
inclusive and open-ended approach, involving multiple stakeholders ith roles that can fluctuate 
depending on circumstances and desired outcomes. Generally the Place Coordinator has a facilitator role 
that allos them to ork ith all stakeholders in order to understand their issues and find solutions to 
improve their surroundings. Communities and stakeholders are perceived to be driving activities on the 
ground. t a policy level, the ton council is seen as being an active partner ith an ear to the ground, 
but not a champion ith a strong influence on the direction of the activities. In this sense, the elsh 
Government provides the main steer at the management level for the direction the programme is taking. 
hile local authorities can promote consistency and sustainability, and provide support (financial and 
other), it is important that these are offered (and not imposed) ithout strings attached, and ith an 
understanding that flexibility and freedom are necessary for community actions to successfully ork 
toards building resilience. 
 
hile all of the 13 FRCP projects across England involve some degree of partnership orking, the 
number and range of partners varies considerably, ith some including NGOs and voluntary 
organisations, hile others bring in other local authority departments and national agencies, such as the 
E. Three pathfinders have included community flood groups in their governance structures. This 
indicates a formal involvement of the community, hich should increase resilience more idely. Overall, 
effective partnership orking is recognised by pathfinders as leading to success, and the establishment of 
flood groups has been seen to facilitate multi-agency, partnership orking; all pathfinders reported 
setting up flood groups as a key success of the first year. 
 
Having high-level support for pathfinder projects from ithin local councils and government agencies has 
been seen to be essential, particularly ith acknoledgement of the amount of time it takes to 
implement interventions and build community resilience. The majority of initial pathfinder successes ere 
reported here: 
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• systems are being built to embed pathfinder projects and outputs ithin the local council and 
government agencies;  
• proactive linkages and open communication channels are being facilitated by an intermediary agent 
(such as the NFF) beteen community members, local authorities and contractors; and 
• council representatives are engaged members of pathfinder steering groups, involved in decision-
making and listening to communities. 
 
To accurately measure the level of success achieved ould require further context and information on 
their starting points. It is not fully clear hat relationships ere already established and hat 
conversations had already occurred beteen the parties.  
 
In general, there is not enough evidence to dra any conclusions on a specific mode or structure that 
orks, but some characteristics can be identified as factors of success: flexibility, community participation 
and partnership orking. These can be found in different modes/models of governance. Once the 
evaluation of the pathfinders project is complete, it may be possible to say more about ho the different 
models have orked and the associated outcomes. 
 
The role of central government 
Central government does not appear to be a common actor or leading partner in community initiatives 
on climate change in the global revie by Castan Broto and Bulkeley (2013). This may also be true in the 
UK, as community resilience to climate change is not currently considered a clear government priority. 
Though evidence is limited, hat is clear is that central government can have a role in providing the 
‘signal’ and putting in place an enabling policy frameork for such initiatives to emerge, as ell as funding 
for community level projects.  
 
This revie of the evidence has shon that the Pitt revie (2007), undertaken as a result of the 2007 
flooding in the UK, combined ith a focus on community resilience, to have been key drivers for ‘the 
Environment gency and emergency flood responders to ork more closely ith communities and to 
encourage people to get involved in volunteering’ (Forest Research, 2015). Central government has also 
provided the funding for the FRCP. The pathfinders have been able to move action from a reactive mode 
into a more proactive, planning mode because of their focus at the local level. Hoever, one of the key 
aspects of that enabling frameork, funding, has no ended, and it ill be interesting to see ho far 
activities that have been started under the pathfinder programme are sustained into the future. Similarly, 
a supportive funding frameork nationally has been important in the development of community energy 
schemes, but policy changes (for example, to feed-in tariffs) may affect this in future, and other options, 
including the use of community finance through share schemes, are becoming increasingly important. 
 
The role of local authorities 
Though Castan Broto and Bulkeley’s international revie (2013) portrays local authorities as the leading 
actor in the majority of cases internationally, the UK presents a different picture. CG Consultants 
(Jones, 2015) found that only 23% of local councils across the UK had signed up to the Climate Local 
programme and produced an action plan outlining commitments on carbon reduction and/or climate 
resilience.  
 
The lack of initiative from local authorities in the UK could be attributed to the lack of a mandate or 
statutory requirement for action to address climate change, and also to a lack of capacity to undertake 
initiatives ithout additional funding, given current spending cuts. Funding cuts and reductions in staffing 
levels coinciding ith increased responsibilities have sapped institutional capacity and appetite to address 
climate change risks (Porter et al., 2015). Most action in the UK has been supported by funding secured 
either through a central government scheme/programme (e.g. Defra’s FRCP; DECC’s Lo Carbon 
Communities) or though external funding from a charitable trust (e.g. Carnegie Trust, Esmée Fairbairn 
Foundation, BLF, etc.). Unfortunately, information on the funding of existing activities orldide is 
fragmented (Castan Broto and Bulkeley, 2013), not alloing any conclusions to be dran on the 
importance of funding as a factor in explaining the leading role of local authorities.  
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Regardless of hether or not local authorities are a leading actor, they are often a crucial actor in 
partnerships aiming to develop community resilience. In a revie of food groing projects in Brighton 
and Hove, Rebecca hite notes that one of the ‘key ingredients’ of developing resilience as the 
Brighton and Hove local council, in terms of providing a ‘stable and supportive planning frameork’, 
‘recognition’ and ‘economic and in-kind support'.15 Similarly, local authorities have acted as a broker in 
the Cynefin case study establishing the Place Coordinators, ho have been a catalyst for action in the 
pathfinders and have to some extent supported the Gro Heathro initiative. On the contrary, local 
planning authorities mirrored the distrust of local community and companies in the Norton case study. 
 
The role of civil society organisations 
Civil society organisations16, e.g. non-state actors like NGOs, international foundations and community 
groups, are increasingly involved in responding to climate change (Bulkeley and Neell, 2010), giving rise 
to partnerships. Hargreaves et al.’s (2013) analysis of 113 case study reports about community energy 
projects in the UK provides useful information on ho communities are partnering ith. They found that, 
on average, three partners ere mentioned per community energy project; voluntary and community 
organisations ere most commonly identified as partners (58%), folloed by local authorities (49%) and 
private companies (49%).  significant point to note is that a very ide range of partners ere mentioned 
(schools, faith groups, local libraries, housing associations, etc.).  
 
Emerging from the UK revie of community action, e also found the role of intermediary linking 
organisations to be a particularly important one, many of hom are civil society organisations. 
 
The role of intermediary organisations 
Intermediary organisations, especially civil society organisations, are often crucial in linking communities 
and institutions. orking on the ground, they build a relationship beteen the local community and 
other stakeholders facilitating the establishment of trust and co-operation. Intermediary organisations 
can have a role in partnerships, as ell as less formal forms of co-operation. They can play various roles, 
from connecting stakeholders and agendas to convening and brokering partnerships, and facilitating 
shared learning. 
 
Connecting stakeholders 
 key success factor in communal food groing ork in East Sussex17 as found to be the 
interdependence beteen food-groing gardens and a netork of affiliated intermediary organisations 
ith multiple roles (hite and Stirling, 2013). This as said to foster longevity of the activity, hile also 
enabling broader-scale change in food systems at a local level. In Brighton and Hove, such an 
intermediary as the Brighton and Hove Food Partnership,18 hich as found to be particularly 
important not only in linking actors and groups, but also in helping to develop a collective identity across 
groing spaces and groups in the city, in light of the differing roles food groing played for different 
stakeholders (e.g. ell-being, skills development, etc.). Finally, hite notes that the partnership also 
‘[at]tended to local systemic barriers (…), like planning, funding and linking volunteers’, something the 
food groing groups ould not have the time or resources to deal ith.  
 
The implication of this is that government and funding organisations, and associated policy, need to 
support intermediary organisations playing multiple roles and that these organisations, ith a broad remit, 
but orking at the local scale, can be an important part of civil society-based innovation systems. 
 
Convening and brokering partnerships 
The Liverpool pathfinder project has community engagement at the heart of its approach. Members of 
the community are involved in, and take responsibility for, managing flood risk in co-ordination ith 
institutions such as the E, the local ater company and relevant departments ithin the local authority.  
 
The NFF is the partner bringing these institutions and members of community together. The project has 
also involved the creation of the first Flood ction Group (FG) in Liverpool, using an approach to 
community engagement developed by the NFF. Further, the NFF-appointed engagement officer has 
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been valuable in ensuring any conflicts beteen the different groups and individuals involved ere 
managed and not alloed to derail the process. 
 
“There as already a level of informal netorking beteen residents and beteen residents 
and Council Officers but this has gron in dignity and strength. The relationship beteen 
the residents and council officers has matured.”  
Intervieee 2, Liverpool pathfinder case study 
 
Connecting agendas 
nother example of the importance of intermediaries is the Cynefin programme, hich actively brings 
together local people, community groups, businesses and organisations that deliver services to improve 
here they live or ork using Place Coordinators.  
 
The programme has an inclusive approach, orking ith multiple stakeholders ranging from the private 
sector and NGOs to universities. To facilitate and manage links beteen stakeholders, the Cynefin 
programme has nine Place Coordinators orking on the ground in the localities, making place-based 
improvements and influencing policy at local level. The Place Coordinators have the freedom to engage 
ith a ide range of stakeholders, to find hat the needs of a community are and ho those needs can 
be delivered. Importantly, it is the Place Coordinator ho strives for a mandate from the communities to 
help make connections and find ho information, policy and funding can help to deliver the objectives on 
the ground. lthough the process is overseen by the management team of Cynefin, the ork on the 
ground is mainly directed by the communities:  
 
“elsh Government has shon us the confidence and the trust that e can find solutions 
by orking on the ground ith communities. So e’re not driven by pressures above, but 
rather a combination of bottom-up and top-don processes here both have a role to play 
in making places better.” 
Intervieee 1, Llanelli Cynefin case study 
 
The delivery of the initiative is very open-ended: once Place Coordinators have established stakeholder 
visioning and engagement and have gained an understanding and a mandate from the area about hat 
they ant to achieve, they develop targets and objectives for the ork. The Cynefin initiative has built-in 
flexibility so that Place Coordinators can change their agenda to respond to any opportunities and 
partnerships that arise and fit ith the aims of their communities. 
 
Sharing and spreading learning, and facilitating innovation 
Hargreaves et al. (2013) focus on ‘grassroots innovations’ and introduce the idea of boundary 
organisations, building on niche theories that see innovations as coming from small scale and relatively 
protected niches. They go on to emphasise the need for fundamental changes, ‘hether in technologies 
and infrastructure or in social norms, values and institutions’, as opposed to incremental improvements. 
Intermediaries – boundary organisations that play a bridging role – are seen as key to ensuring that 
individual projects and their experiences get communicated and exchanged, gradually forming a shared 
trajectory and enabling the innovation to spread. For instance, the NFF, the main intermediary in the 
pathfinder case study and scheme, has organised a conference aimed at disseminating the findings and 
lessons learned from the FRCP scheme among communities and practitioners. 
 
Intermediary organisations’ ork includes aggregating and making available information about grassroots 
innovations, providing training and advice and helping to initiate ne projects. Nonetheless, in intervies 
conducted by Hargreaves et al. (2013) ith 15 representatives of UK intermediary organisations on 
community energy innovations, intervieees acknoledged the difficulty of replicating innovations, 
particularly given the importance of local context. They suggested that hile sharing information about 
technical aspects is one part of their ork, a critical contribution they make is to give local projects the 
confidence to be able to address locally-specific challenges as and hen they arise.  
 
Overall, intermediary organisations appear to be valuable for community initiatives building resilience, 
regardless of the scale of initiative, theme (energy, food, flood), governance arrangements or type of 
partnership. Hoever, Cinderby et al. (2014) arn: ‘Over reliance on outside agencies does not instil 
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resilience in communities.’ Increased self-determination of a community is an important aspect of 
building community resilience, and a balanced partnership is needed for a successful initiative. 
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9 The relationship beteen 
vulnerability and resilience 
Box 9: Key messages on the relationship beteen vulnerability and resilience 
 
• Social vulnerability of communities to general or specific issues is not just the opposite of 
resilience: it is possible for a person or community to be vulnerable to some shocks and stresses in 
some ays, but also to be resilient through having the capacity to adapt or overcome that 
vulnerability.  
 
• Relying on community action to address the consequences of climate change may reinforce 
social inequalities.  positive framing of resilience can overemphasise the ability of those dealing 
ith shocks and stresses to be able to cope, and shifts responsibility for dealing ith crises aay from 
the state. The costs of coping and the burden on some groups in the community can be overlooked. 
 
• There is a need for government direction if action on resilience is also going to address 
vulnerability and social justice: unless community action is directed to address underlying social 
vulnerability, then it may not happen. There is a role for government to develop a strategic approach 
for action on resilience to climate change that addresses climate vulnerability and builds on 
community capacities. This suggests a tension in devolving responsibility for action to communities. 
 
• Resilience should not reproduce social vulnerabilities: resilience as 'bounce-back' in the context of 
shocks is not enough for longer-term management of climate change, particularly if high levels of 
vulnerabilities exist in a community. 
 
There is a ide range of research on hat makes people vulnerable in the context of climate change (see, 
for example, Lindley et al., 2011). This evidence revie recognises that the social vulnerability of 
communities to different consequences of climate change is not just the opposite of community 
resilience. It is possible to be vulnerable to some shocks or stresses in some ays, but resilient in others. 
For example, a person on a lo income ho is exposed to flood risk and cannot afford flood insurance 
could be resilient due to effective flood defences, an early arning system, and fast emergency service 
responses that reduce flood damage and associated costs. 
 
alker and Burningham (2011) consider the social vulnerabilities of individuals to reflect and reproduce 
the existing pattern of inequalities in society, or systemic inequalities. Their ork shos that those ho 
are most vulnerable to climate change consequences ill, in many cases, be those ho are most 
vulnerable to other negative impacts (i.e. people ho are already affected by poverty, poor health or 
disabilities). Cutter et al. (2003) extend this to place-related inequalities as ell:  
 
Social vulnerability is partially the product of social inequalities – those social factors that 
influence or shape the susceptibility of various groups to harm and that also govern their 
ability to respond. Hoever, it also includes place inequalities – those characteristics of 
communities and the built environment, such as the level of urbanisation, groth rates and 
economic vitality that contribute to the social vulnerability of places.  
 
In relation to earthquakes in Christchurch, Ne Zealand, Hayard (2013) also highlights the issue of 
underlying inequalities and ho they exacerbate the social vulnerabilities of individuals that emerge 
ithin a disaster: ‘in reality, our internal relationships of class, gender, and ethnic inequalities also greatly 
exacerbate community vulnerability’. Vulnerability is a function of the exposure and sensitivity of a 
system, and:  
 
Vulnerability is the pre-event, inherent characteristics or qualities of social systems that 
create the potential for harm…. Resilience is the ability of a social system to respond and 
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recover from disasters and includes those inherent conditions that allo the system to 
absorb impacts and cope ith an event, as ell as post-event, adaptive processes that 
facilitate the ability of the social system to re-organize, change, and learn in response to a 
threat.  
Cutter et al., 2008 
 
Menoni et al. (2011) state: ‘Sometimes getting back to the exact pre-event conditions is just the opposite 
of resilience, particularly hen [a] high level of vulnerabilities characterized that condition.’ Ultimately, 
vulnerability research needs to be pulled through more clearly into the area of resilience for resilience 
building to be effective. In addition to the potential effect of pre-existing vulnerabilities ithin 
communities on their ability to respond to, recover from and adapt to climate change, recent ork shos 
that approximately to-thirds of the most socially flood-vulnerable places in the UK are also socially 
heat-vulnerable, and that many socially deprived neighbourhoods are also socially vulnerable to climate 
change. Lindley et al. (2011) suggest: 
 
daptation policy has focused on personal factors (such as health and age) and 
environmental features (such as flood prevention) but also needs to address social factors 
(such as income inequalities, the existence of social netorks and the social characteristics 
of neighbourhoods). 
 
This means that some parts of the UK may need more support than others to respond to the challenges 
of climate change, and to avoid its effects exacerbating poverty and disadvantage. 
 
Evidence of vulnerability in action 
The revie has found that the term ‘vulnerability’ rarely features in evidence relating to community food 
or energy practice and climate change, except in relation to food security and fuel poverty. Building 
‘social resilience’ is a core aim of many community food groing actions, hich often target areas of 
social deprivation and, as hite and Stirling’s (2013) ork in East Sussex and the Local Food evaluation 
report identified, can provide ‘a vehicle for a number of social benefits’ (Kiran et al., 2011).  
 
Regarding community energy, Bulkeley and Fuller (2013) address vulnerability, specifically energy 
vulnerability, in their report Lo carbon communities and social justice:  
 
This focus on the need to address existing energy vulnerability has emerged over time, as 
the needs of marginal groups have become recognised. One example of this is the DECC 
Lo Carbon Communities Challenge, here the bid initially targeted housing association 
properties ith PV as it as felt that ‘their residents ere representative of those most in 
need or most likely to benefit’… Hoever, ‘fuel poverty’ remains a rather circumscribed 
concept, and ider issues of vulnerability and inequality may pass unnoticed as a result. 
 
In addition, IPPR’s evaluation of the British Gas Green Streets challenge refers to ‘social vulnerability’ on 
to occasions, but it is not a core theme in this report or more idely across the evidence base on 
community energy generation and efficiency actions (Platt et al., 2011).  
 
Box 10 illustrates the case of the Norton community ind energy project, here addressing existing 
social vulnerabilities is one of the objectives of the project founders. 
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Box 10: Learning from the case studies: Norton community ind energy project 
 
Social and economic regeneration is one of the main project objectives of the community-interest 
energy company that initiated the Norton community ind energy project. By ensuring profits stay in the 
local area and providing substantial finance for lo-carbon projects, the project developers aim to 
generate jobs and investment that can rejuvenate the local economy. s one of the energy company 
directors intervieed said, community resilience is here partly about ‘making local jobs in small local 
industries’ and providing the area ith a degree of economic self-sufficiency. To some degree, this aim 
as also related to dealing ith existing vulnerabilities in the local area – parts of the parish are relatively 
socio-economically deprived, and the company’s leaders sa an opportunity to remedy this through a 
community ind energy project: 
 
“No, the project e’re orking on… it’s in an area of South Yorkshire that’s quite deprived, and has     
been ravaged previously by capital through coal mining … So, you kno, there is an opportunity to do it in 
a different ay, there’s an opportunity for capacity building, social action, social change … and our project 
is very much aimed at identifying a program of sort of regeneration initiatives and social initiatives, 
environmental initiatives and projects, to help change this place for the better.”  
Community-interest energy company director 2 – quoted in Jeong et al., 2012 
 
 
 greater number of references to vulnerability ere found in evidence relating to flooding and ider 
community resilience practices. For example, the Climate change summary (CLS Climate Change 
Netork, 2014) produced as part of the BLF’s Communities Living Sustainably (CLS) programme, 
outlined projects that have identified three groups of people vulnerable to climate change in their 
communities:  
 
[…] people hose livelihoods are at risk (farming, sea fishing, e.g. CLS in Dorset), people ho 
do not have resources (lo income e.g. Greening ingrove, Necastle), or particular 
groups that face social isolation (older people, single mothers, mothers ho do not speak 
English – across projects).  
 
Hoever, in such evidence, ‘vulnerability’ as often seen to be used in opposition to ‘resilience’, ith 
some reports explicitly expressing a preference for the latter, hich is indicative of the debate that exists 
in both the literature and action over the to terms. The question is raised as to hether vulnerability is 
addressed at all if community actions take a resilience approach. The evidence suggests that some 
attention has been given to vulnerable groups by emergency planning agencies.  
 
The overall lack of focus on social vulnerability and emphasis on resilience by the revieed evidence of 
community action is likely due to the specific focus of the search on community resilience and 
vulnerability linked to climate change. Further research is needed, but evidence seems to suggest that 
unless community action is directed to address vulnerability, then it is the decision of community groups 
and local authorities as to hether this occurs, and it may not happen. This is here there is a role for 
government to direct action. This suggests a fundamental tension in devolving responsibility for climate 
change action to the community level.  
 
The results have shon that identifying social vulnerability has become codified in emergency behaviour; 
it is part of the formal response process no to ask ‘ho is vulnerable?’ to the shock, such as a flood 
event, but from the analysis undertaken for this report it is difficult to discern the extent to hich 
community food and energy projects are trying to address underlying capacities and vulnerabilities. 
Further revie and assessment of the cumulative impact of community action relating to climate change 
is needed, but it ill be difficult; careful consideration of the indicators employed to measure this ill be 
essential. 
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Resilience and localism approaches: implications for 
vulnerability and social justice 
Framing community actions as resilience building can shift analysis aay from vulnerability (Cannon and 
Muller-Mahn, 2010), and community actions aay from addressing social vulnerabilities and inequalities. 
 positive framing of resilience, ith its suggestion that people can have agency in the face of difficulties, 
overemphasises the ability of those dealing ith shocks and stresses to be able to cope, and shifts 
responsibility for dealing ith crises aay from those in poer. Further, structural vulnerability is often 
not under an individual’s control, and ill depend on the location and poer relations ithin a system. The 
risk of taking this kind of approach is that the costs of coping and the burden on some groups ithin the 
community can be overlooked (Harrison, 2012). Furthermore, pre-existing conditions that may 
exacerbate climate change consequences or impede transitions toards a lo-carbon society can be 
forgotten, e.g. social inequalities and poer relations beteen actors.  
 
ith this in mind, there are particular implications for social inequalities in the shift of responsibility for 
climate change action (especially related to flood risk management, and energy generation and efficiency) 
to the community level implicit in the localism approach. Bulkeley and Fuller (2012) question the justice 
principles and the expectations of this shift:  
 
This shift from an emphasis on individual action to community responses has been 
portrayed as one that ill enable a more just response to climate change. Policy and actions 
ill be more inclusive, responsibilities for action may be shared, and the risks and benefits of 
the lo carbon transition more evenly distributed, so the argument goes. 
 
Hoever their evidence suggests that there is not yet recognition at policy level of the inherent 
differences in communities’ levels of capacities and resources. Their revie of nine UK lo-carbon 
community programmes, representing a range of different approaches to climate mitigation at a 
community level, suggests that there is no one single ‘type’ of lo-carbon community: ‘various types are 
emerging, reflecting the diverse drivers of government, private sector and grassroots organisations…. nd 
it is evident from all of the programmes that the community is recognised as a critical site for addressing 
climate change’ (Bulkeley and Fuller, 2012). There cannot be one single type of lo-carbon community 
because context, characteristics, capacities, and social and place inequalities ill differ in each community. 
ll nine programmes revieed by Bulkeley and Fuller (2012) ‘ultimately place responsibility for climate 
mitigation on the communities themselves’ and ‘highlight the positive benefits of lo carbon 
communities, including local investment, job creation, fuel poverty and climate change’. Broad 
assumptions are made that all communities are equally equipped to act, that any costs and benefits of 
community actions ill be evenly distributed, and that community action ill address social inequity.  
 
s Preston et al.’s (2014) revie of social justice and climate change arns:  
 
[…] loer-income and other disadvantaged groups contribute least to causing climate 
change but are likely to be most negatively affected by it; they pay, as a proportion of 
income, the most toards implementing certain policy responses and benefit least from 
those policies; and their voices tend to go unheard in decision making.  
 
Social factors (i.e. social, economic and place inequalities), starting point and precedence (i.e. building on 
existing netorks, interventions, resources and flooding experience) of community actions ill help to 
determine here a community is on the resilience ‘pathay’ or ‘continuum’, and the extent to hich 
community members are able to act and to build resilience. This is an essential point, both in relation to 
planning for disaster and for a lo-carbon future, as this affects communities’ ability to respond and to 
cope ith climate uncertainty. 
 
Building community resilience to address climate change consequences ill dra on, as ell as develop, 
capacities of individuals and communities. Social vulnerabilities should not be reproduced. Frameorks 
that enable the analysis of the capacities and vulnerabilities of a community could be used at the start of 
an intervention to develop resilience to climate change. For example, Cutter et al. (2010) provide a useful 
frameork for thinking about the specific types of skill and capacity that might be needed to address 
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climate change shocks and stresses, hile Transition provides examples of skills and capacities for moving 
toards a lo-carbon future. 
 
Both resilience and vulnerability need to be understood in order to be able to develop community 
capacities for reactive and proactive responses to climate change consequences. To underplay or ignore 
social inequalities and poer relations beteen actors ithin the flood risk system ould be to provide an 
incomplete analysis of the issues, and any solutions developed to address those issues. Ultimately, 
resilience ill mean different things to different people in different places, and it is important that 
resilience building activities start from people’s aareness of their strengths and vulnerabilities if they are 
to be effective and avoid reinforcing existing inequalities. 
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10 Conclusions and key messages 
This section dras out general conclusions and lessons useful for developing future community resilience 
initiatives in the context of climate change and the transition to a lo-carbon society, and for refining 
current activities. The conclusions also address the particular needs of disadvantaged groups and the 
challenges of involving such groups in community resilience to climate change actions.  
 
The concept of resilience in the context of climate change is used in a number of different ays by 
different UK Government departments, practitioners and academics and, as such, it is contested. 
Hoever, the ay it is defined is central to here action is directed and ho actions at the local level are 
focused. Currently, here the concept is used in practice, it tends to provide only a framing, rather than 
being used to assess project progress/success, or as a ay to develop interventions.  
 
Clearly there is a patchork of activity being carried out and this revie has provided a snapshot of 
activities here it has been possible to get details. There is community action explicitly on climate 
change/lo-carbon transitions being carried out by a variety of actors ithin the UK, but it is not usually 
framed as resilience, possibly because most of it is focused on mitigation rather than adaptation. 
Resilience is more commonly used to refer to responding to emergencies and direct impacts of extreme 
eather associated ith climate change, rather than the longer-term societal ability to deal ith other 
indirect impacts of climate change, or a shift to living in a loer-carbon economy and society.  
 
lso there is community action related to food groing, and energy generation and efficiency, hich 
some of the climate change groups (particularly Transition) might argue contributes to community 
climate change resilience, but for hich combating climate change may not be a goal at all.  
 
Finally, community flood risk management is being framed by Defra as resilience, but still sits largely 
ithin the emergency planning arena and does not link into other government policies on climate 
change. 
 
Hoever, the value of taking a resilience approach to climate change in this revie has meant that these 
different actions are being considered in relation to each other. hile those involved are not making 
links beteen the actions, and beteen the actions and climate change, making those links, as this report 
has done, is a valuable step forard in understanding the pattern of resilience to climate change in the 
UK.  
The frameork of analysis proposed at the end of Chapter 5 included three components: 
 
• taking a capacity/resource approach to understanding ho activities might be contributing to 
developing community resilience in the context of climate change; 
• the value of distinguishing beteen proactive and reactive modes of resilience; and 
• the importance of community engagement and multi-level governance. 
 
This evidence revie allos us to dra a number of conclusions in relation to these components. 
 
Taking a capacity/resource approach 
Taking a capacity approach is useful in order to understand ho activities might be contributing to 
developing community resilience in the context of climate change. More specifically, there is some 
evidence that in order to successfully build community resilience ithin the context of climate change, 
possession of a certain level of capacity is needed in all five categories of resilience: social, economic, 
infrastructure and institutional resilience, and community capital.  
 
In terms of the interactions beteen the different types of capacity, e have seen ho institutional 
capacity and community capital interact: setting up groups focused on activities such as flood risk 
management, community food groing and community energy not only develops social netorks 
beteen citizens and develops personal relationships, but inevitably these activities bring those netorks 
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into contact ith the governance structures and institutions in local areas. The interface beteen 
community netorks and institutional netorks enables local actions to become part of ider 
governance structures. There is some confirmation of the suggestion (Cinderby et al., 2014; Young 
Foundation, 2012) that community capital (i.e. netorks, trust and relationships in a local area) is a core 
capacity ithout hich these types of action are not like to succeed. Community capital is a key aspect 
that is developed through community engagement, hich is therefore a central process for developing 
climate resilience. 
 
Distinguishing beteen proactive and reactive modes 
of resilience 
Of the three areas of community action in the context of climate change focused on by this evidence 
revie, community actions relating to food groing seem to have the greatest potential for engaging 
people in community resilience to ider climate change consequences, closely folloed by community 
action on energy. Community flood risk management actions currently seem to ork primarily in 
isolation, but the TCV, and Liverpool and est Sussex FRCP projects, offer innovative approaches. The 
potential advantages for flood risk management are the emergency planning structures (e.g. Local 
Resilience Fora, Community Resilience guidance, etc.) that are in place, ith the Cabinet Office’s 
emphasis on developing community resilience to a hole range of shocks. Hoever, hile this may help 
communities to move to consider a range of shocks, it is not framed in relation to climate change and 
does not necessarily mean that links ill be made to transitions toards a lo-carbon society. 
Consideration of ho to link this programme to the ider context of adaptation to climate change ould 
be useful further research.  
 
Broadly, the ork ithin flood risk management sits beteen the reactive ‘bounce-back’ and proactive 
‘adaptive’ approaches to climate change. It is less clear ho to categorise food groing and community 
energy projects. This is because hile they are broadly proactive, the diversity of drivers and complexity 
of outcomes make it difficult to say that one mode fits all approaches. The Transition movement model is 
an important learning tool, because Transition initiatives have broader aims related to climate change and 
peak oil, and tend to focus on multiple areas (that is, activities may focus on a range of areas, including 
food groing or energy). The extent of influence of a group ill quite often go beyond its members. 
These examples indicate that successfully building community resilience to climate change, going beyond 
specific consequences, is about having governance structures and netorks in place to enable ider 
action. 
 
Community engagement and multi-level governance 
Community action related to food groing is seen as the area here the most community-led, bottom-
up action occurs. The multiple drivers for community food groing action may mean climate change aims 
are lost, but community capacity is successfully developed, hich could have the potential to be 
harnessed in response to other implications of climate change. 
 
Community action on flood risk management is commonly driven at the community level in the first 
instance, by a community’s experience and response to a flood event (hich may be facilitated by a 
trusted intermediary agent such as the NFF), as ell as the strong desire of the UK Government to 
devolve responsibility for flood risk management to communities and implicit government cuts, hich 
reduce spending on flood defences, and national and local flood risk management agencies.  
 
Examining the roles of different stakeholders identifies a key role for intermediary bodies that facilitate 
links beteen the informal structures of local communities and the formal structures of local and national 
government, as ell as linking local actions to ider netorks. These may be NGOs (e.g. the NFF), 
netorks of organisations (e.g. the Transition Movement) or individuals (e.g. Place Coordinators). hat is 
also clear is that ithin the current political context of localism, an emphasis on removing regulation and 
major spending cuts for the public sector, local authorities are unlikely to be leading these types of action, 
and their involvement is going to be very dependent on priorities of individual councils, pre-existing 
partnerships and the availability of funding. This is likely to lead to an uneven approach across the UK to 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change. 
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Despite the shift toards community responsibility for flood risk management, and also for energy 
generation and efficiency measures, there is not yet recognition of the inherent differences in 
communities’ levels of capacity. This is an important point, both in relation to planning for disaster and for 
a lo-carbon future, as this affects communities’ ability to respond and to cope ith climate uncertainty. 
Related to this is the fact that vulnerability/social justice is not central to the resilience framings, and as 
such there is a danger that many climate change initiatives do not reach out beyond the ‘usual suspects’. 
Further, there is groing evidence that the context of the localism agenda, the abandonment of climate 
change targets at the local level and major public sector spending cuts mean that actions on’t be 
focused on those ho are climate vulnerable, and that overall, the present piecemeal approach to 
addressing climate change consequences and transitions toard a lo-carbon society ill continue. 
 
 frameork for developing communities’ resilience to 
climate change 
Finally, this ork suggests that the folloing key components could be used as a frameork to develop 
the resilience of communities to climate change and to move toards lo-carbon futures. 
 
Capacities/vulnerabilities 
Understanding the existing capacities and vulnerabilities of individuals ithin local areas is vital if 
resilience to climate change is to be developed, and existing vulnerabilities not reproduced. There is a 
need for specific knoledge and skills relating to climate change consequences and moving to lo-
carbon communities, as ell as general capacities. These should be built on existing capacities and linked 
ith the lived experience of local citizens. Cutter et al’s. (2010) frameork as found to be useful for 
thinking about the specific types of skill and capacity that might be needed in relation to climate change 
consequences, and the experience of Transition initiatives provides examples of moving toards a lo 
carbon future. 
 
Engagement and empoerment of citizens 
For local actions to be successful, engagement and empoerment of citizens is vital. This is a difficult 
area, ith top-don interventions sometimes leading to communities being engaged instrumentally, as 
delivery agents for government policy that is unlikely to lead to success. Some community-led actions ill 
remain outside the mainstream, but provide useful challenges to the existing status quo. 
 
Collaborative governance 
Linked to the issue of citizen engagement is collaborative governance. From the evidence revie it is 
clear that both formal and informal structures of governance are needed for actions to be successful. 
Links beteen local groups, local authorities and boundary intermediary organisations enable the locals 
to be netorked into ider structures, so that formal structures can provide lasting change and learning 
from that local activity. For example, a flood action group made up of local people ho seek to develop 
the capacities to cope ith flooding ill be helped by a local authority, hich then includes the measures 
developed ithin a ider flood resilience plan. Hoever, this becomes challenging in a context here 
local authority and other public bodies (e.g. the E) are facing cuts. 
 
Catalysts for action 
Through much of the community action revie and our case studies, it is clear that there are catalysts 
that lead to actions and these can take a number of forms, including: 
 
• key people – these can be activists ithin communities, and examples include Plane Stupid coming to 
Heathro, as ell as the Cynefin Place Coordinators and the Norton entrepreneurs; 
• funding opportunities – clearly the numerous programmes that have provided funding opportunities 
for community groups and local government have generated actions and interventions; and 
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• direct experiences or threats – for example, the experience of a flood or the threat of fracking 
locally is often enough to bring people in a community together, and sometimes that ill lead to 
future resilience building. 
 
Vision – future thinking 
For a step change in responses to climate change, a clear vision or direction is needed at both the local 
and national levels. It is clear that the UK Government has a role to play in setting that vision in terms of 
policy. Beyond the national government level, the Transition movement does provide a vision of an 
alternative society that adapts to peak oil and climate change. Hoever, even ith 400 groups across the 
country, this remains a minority perspective. Overall there is a lack of coherence. This means that the 
different parts may not add up to more than their sum. 
 
Lack of evidence 
hile there are a number of frameorks and good practice, together ith evaluations of large 
government programmes, there is still a lack of evidence of the ays in hich resilience building in the 
context of climate change is happening at the local level; the processes and structures that are making 
the projects a success or failure; or the key ingredients that ill deliver scaleable societal change. Given 
also the lack of common frameorks for evaluation, it is hard to kno if all these local projects and 
actions are coming together to constitute a significant change for the UK in terms of building resilience 
to the consequences of climate change and moving toards a lo-carbon society. 
 
Key findings 
• cademic, policy and practitioner definitions of resilience are varied, and hile common themes can 
be discerned, there is a lack of consensus. Currently, the policy focus in relation to community 
resilience is generally on direct shocks due to climate change, leading to an emphasis on emergency 
planning and the role of the community in relation to other institutions, particularly focusing on flood 
risk management. This emphasises a predominantly reactive approach. Other areas of policy are 
directed toards indirect shocks and stresses relating to climate change, but they are not framed as 
supporting community resilience, for example, the Lo Carbon Communities programme, and the 
Community Energy strategy.  
• This patchork of definitions is echoed by the patchork of actions being carried out in relation to 
climate change resilience. In the areas of community energy, food groing and flooding, framings of 
resilience varied, as did drivers for action; some focused on climate change, but also on building 
community (e.g. through food groing) and responding to a risk (e.g. flooding). Putting these all 
under the umbrella of climate change allos examination of gaps and, going forard, should inform 
an overall approach to enabling actions at the community level. 
• There is a lack of evaluation data ith respect to actions relating to climate change resilience. 
Many projects do not have the resources to carry out evaluations, and evaluations that are carried 
out relating to programmes of funding are often not detailed enough to dra out the subtleties of 
hat orks and hat does not in practice.  
• Hoever, the availability of economic, infrastructure and community/human capacities appears to be 
crucial in supporting the development of resilience. Building on hat already exists can increase 
success. It is important to understand the starting point and the capacities that are already in a 
community to inform action on climate change. 
• Community engagement ith all sections of the local community encourages understanding and 
onership of actions on climate change. Effective engagement requires an understanding of the 
needs and concerns of the community. Local knoledge can be particularly useful in identifying the 
most appropriate approach to engagement, and framing the initiative in a ay that resonates ith 
members of the community and encourages more participation.  
•  lack of national strategy to build community resilience to climate change means that areas of 
climate vulnerability are not being targeted. Many areas ith climate vulnerability are also those likely 
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to have loer levels of pre-existing capacities that could support climate change resilience, hich 
may mean that the most vulnerable are least likely to develop community resilience strategies. 
• The localism agenda, together ith the removal of targets for climate change actions and 
severe cuts to local authority budgets means that building community resilience to climate change 
is unlikely to be a priority for local authorities, ith the implication that they ill not be leading 
initiatives, and partnering only hen it facilitates delivery of other statutory requirements.  
• Future research could test out the usefulness of the frameork developed to build resilience to the 
consequences of climate change and move toards a lo-carbon society. That is, a focus on 
community capacities, empoerment of citizens, collaborative governance, catalysts for action and 
vision/future thinking. Investigating these in place-based analyses of the facilitators and barriers to 
climate resilience could be a ay to progress this area. 
Key recommendations 
Local authorities 
• Local authorities could use areas of statutory ork, e.g. on flood risk and energy, to gro community 
resilience to a ider set of climate change issues. Furthermore, other policy agendas such as spatial 
planning and health could be an important route for developing clearer local climate resilience 
strategies and actions, e.g. to enable green infrastructure as part of efforts to support vulnerable 
communities, or developing heatave plans for care homes. 
• They could recognise and develop a role linking formal and informal processes of governance (e.g. 
beteen local councils and voluntary and community groups) and develop approaches to 
partnership-orking that allo for grassroots and intermediaries’ involvement, e.g. orking ith the 
Transition movement, or the NFF. 
• Initial funding is a key factor for the success of community climate change resilience initiatives. In a 
context of shrinking local authority budgets, developing multi-stakeholder partnerships can facilitate 
access to alternative sources of funding.  
• Community capacity, skills and netorks are crucial components of resilience to climate change, and 
to ider shocks and stresses. Local authorities can help build this by recognising the value of 
community-led actions across departments, involving representatives in multi-agency meetings, and 
promoting links beteen community organisations and institutions ith responsibilities for climate 
action.  
• Local authorities could identify people and places that face high social vulnerability to the 
consequences of climate change, and facilitate partnerships to carry out actions to support the most 
vulnerable communities in developing resilience. 
 
National government 
• Overall, ‘Central Government needs to provide stronger leadership on climate change adaptation to 
increase its political visibility and urgency amongst local government’ (Porter et al., 2015). 
• Central government could develop a cross-government definition and approach to community 
resilience in the context of climate change that goes beyond emergency planning, includes a 
proactive focus, and clarifies the roles of different stakeholders.  
• It should further develop orking across Defra and DCLG on flooding, and Defra and DECC on 
energy and climate change, and link in DFID thinking for the next Climate Change Risk ssessment 
and National daptation Programme.  
• It could also recognise that to achieve the goals of building community resilience to climate change 
requires a clear vision of the role of local authorities as enablers of community action on climate 
change, alongside the voluntary sector and members of local communities.  
• It should focus programmes of grants on areas of social vulnerability and climate hazard exposure. 
For example, it could consider establishing a resilience funding stream ith a clear evaluation 
programme to ensure progress is assessed.  
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• Central government needs to join-up policy on community resilience to climate change by looking at 
opportunities for resilience-building in the context of:  
• measures focusing on mitigation or indirect shocks and stresses relating to climate change, for 
example, the Community Energy strategy and energy efficiency measures, or other social 
interventions; and 
• emergency planning responses, here a longer-term, more proactive approach to prepare and adapt 
to climate change is also needed.  
• For the idest range of civil society organisations to participate, the government needs to support 
the sector to create a national infrastructure that: 
• provides information on funding opportunities and best practice to local service providers, and 
facilitates dialogue beteen all parties about needs, priorities, service design and delivery; 
• assists in the formation of bidding consortia to ensure that civil society organisations of all sizes 
benefit from opportunities to tender for services; and 
• helps service providers to demonstrate impact by providing information on measurement tools and 
frameorks. 
 
Communities 
• Communities can evaluate their capacities (strengths and eaknesses) and start from those points to 
develop ne capacities in relation to climate change resilience. They can learn from existing 
initiatives about ho to make the most of available resources, potential pitfalls to look out for, and 
solutions. 
• They should start activities that develop community participation and netorks, but have a longer-
term vision, as ell as building on local interests to develop interest and engagement. This may not 
alays require a specific focus on climate change. ctions that start by dealing ith a community’s 
daily concerns and aim to increase community ell-being can be more appealing than a specific 
climate change focus. 
• Making links ith key local institutions, e.g. local government, is key to to developing common goals 
and influencing local agendas, sharing learning, and garnering input and support. Understanding the 
focus of the local council and framing activities to make connections ith their agendas can be a 
useful strategy for communities to develop actions. 
• Building in ays to monitor and evaluate community actions from the start ill generate evidence of 
impact and benefits, and share learning and best practice. 
• It is important for communities to recognise that: 
• actions to build resilience are likely to take longer than anticipated; and 
• it is not necessary to be an expert on climate change to increase a community’s climate change 
resilience; other initiatives, such as reclaiming green space for community uses and promoting local 
food production, are excellent ays of building community capacities and developing resilience. 
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Notes 
1. The reference here is to civil society organisations, hich is a broad term meaning the ide range of 
organisations representing the interests of citizens, including non-governmental organisations, 
community groups and advocacy groups. It does not include individual citizens. 
2. See ppendix 3 for details of orkshop participants’ presentations. 
3. In this report, e use the term ‘community’ ith recognition of this complexity, appreciating that 
any practice or intervention must unpack the specific dimensions of the community it is focused 
upon, since these shape the success or otherise of the intervention. 
4. E.g. .readyscotland.org and .alesresilience.gov.uk. In Scotland there has been some 
thinking around the relationship beteen community resilience and community development, ith a 
briefing paper discussing key definitions produced by the Scottish Community Development Centre. 
5. The Cabinet Office produces the National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies (NRR), hich is the 
unclassified version of the National Risk ssessment (NR), a classified assessment of the risks of 
civil emergencies facing the UK over the next five years. The NRR is a public resource for individuals 
and organisations ishing to be better prepared for emergencies. Highest priority risks in the 2015 
edition are pandemic influenza, coastal flooding, idespread electricity failure and catastrophic 
terrorist attacks. Inland flooding, heataves, drought, severe ildfires, lo temperatures and sno, 
storms and gales are also on the register, hich has 19 risks in total (Cabinet Office, 2015). 
6. Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) model – see Cutter et al. (2010) for details. This provides a 
useful, theoretically grounded frameork for resilience to disasters. 
7. In this report the term community engagement is used as an umbrella term to reflect any actions 
beteen citizens and other organisations that meet the criteria from the International ssociation 
of Public Participation (2007) of ‘involve, collaborate, or empoer’. It does not include ‘inform or 
consult’. 
8. hite and Stirling (2013) ‘collectively term projects and intermediaries the communal groing 
‘niche’, understanding this analytical concept to describe a hypothetical space in hich innovations 
can be tried out and developed, at least initially aay from the selective pressures of mainstream 
systems of provisioning. s such, a ‘niche’ is not objectively empirically fixed in any given setting, but 
depends heuristically on the purpose and level of analysis.’ 
9. Volunteering is defined by the Compact Code of Good Practice (the Compact is the agreement 
beteen the government and the voluntary and community sector to improve their relationship for 
the benefit of each other and the communities they serve) as ‘an activity that involves spending 
time, unpaid, doing something that aims to benefit the environment or individuals or groups other 
than (or in addition to) close relatives’ (Compact, 2005). 
10. See https://.transitionnetork.org/about/funding 
11. https://.youtube.com/atch?v=CjQ-vqEx3g 
12. https://.youtube.com/atch?v=R9cQ4tDfSl8 
13. Castan Broto and Bulkeley (2013) present climate change experiments as ‘interventions to try out 
ne ideas and methods in the context of future uncertainties. They serve to understand ho 
interventions ork in practice, in ne contexts here they are thought of as innovative.’ 
14. The study adapted the Bulkeley and Kern (2006) definition of a mode of governance as ‘a set of 
tools and technologies deployed through particular institutional relations through hich agents 
   
 
 
 
   72 
 
seek to reconfigure the specific social and technical relations ith a specific governing purpose, in 
this case, to address climate change’ (Castan Broto and Bulkeley, 2013). 
15. Recordings available at: http://.sustainablelifestyles.ac.uk/projects/community/resilience-and-
sustainable-lifestyles 
16. The reference here is to civil society organisations, hich is a broad term meaning the ide range of 
organisations representing the interests of citizens, including NGOs, community groups and 
advocacy groups. It does not include individual citizens themselves. 
17. Summary and recordings available at: 
http://.sustainablelifestyles.ac.uk/projects/community/resilience-and-sustainable-lifestyles 
18. ccessible at: http://bhfood.org.uk/ 
19. The total of 5,000 has been made on the assumption that the DECC (2014) report, as the most 
recent evidence of community energy projects in the UK revieed, includes the projects cited by 
the other reports in the community energy category. 
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ppendix 1: Overvie of the 
search strategy process 
Figure 7: Flo chart of the search strategy process  
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ppendix 2: Quality assessment 
proforma 
Figure 8: Flo chart of the search strategy process  
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Table 9: Summary of qualitative assurance analysis  
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ppendix 3: ‘Pop-up’ 
presentations of community action 
case examples 
Ten orkshop participants presented case examples of local projects and initiatives that aim to increase 
community resilience to climate driven risks. The folloing table lists the presenters, their affiliation, and 
the case example of community climate change resilience projects and initiatives that each presented. 
 
Table 10: ‘Pop-up’ presentations of community action case examples from the orkshop 
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ppendix 4: Overvie of 
community action in the UK 
Table 11: Overvie of community action in the UK based on the findings of the 
evidence revie (references for Figure 5) 
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